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PRESERVING DUE PROCESS:
REQUIRE THE FRYE AND DAUBERT EXPERT
STANDARDS IN STATE GANG CASES
Fareed Nassor Hayat*

ABSTRACT
Police officers are almost universally offered and admitted as
experts in state gang prosecutions. Without being subjected to the
stringent requirements of Frye and Daubert expert standards,
criminal Defendants’ due process rights are violated. Once
admitted, police officers are permitted to testify to the psychology,
customs, motivations, social structures and subjective mental
states of individual gang members and gang organizations. Police
officers are not scientists and do not use valid scientific methods
in forming their opinions, yet they offer sociological and
psychological expert testimony against criminal Defendants.
Courts frequently refuse to apply Frye or Daubert expert
standards to the testimony of police officers in gang cases, though
they acknowledge the scientific nature of the testimony. Admission
of such testimony results in juries hearing and accepting, unvetted,
unreliable and inadmissible junk science. Verdicts based on police
officers’ junk science testimony denies criminal Defendants’ of
their Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial.
This article advocates for a strict application of the Frye and
Daubert expert standards to police officer testimony, when offered
as experts in state gang prosecutions. Police gang expert
testimony should only be admitted after the underlying criminal
matter has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and even then,
only if the police gang expert testimony abides by clearly defined
rules of evidence. Requiring Frye and Daubert expert standards
for police officer testimony in state gang cases would comply with
constitutional protections and provide consistent application of
clearly defined, and normally strictly adhered to rules of evidence.
Experts labeled as Drug Recognition Experts (DRE) that testify in
driving under the influence cases, experts in civil matters in almost
any context, and expert testimony when offered by criminal
Defendants in “rape trauma syndrome” and “battering and its
effects” cases, all require application and compliance with Frye
and Daubert. Requiring identical standards in state gang
* Fareed Nassor Hayat is an associate Professor of Law at the City University of New York
(CUNY) School of Law. He teaches criminal law, criminal procedure, trial advocacy and lawyering.
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prosecution of criminal Defendants when police officers purport
to be experts, ensures fundamental fairness and due process.
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I provides an overview of
lay-witness and expert witness admissibility standards, and then
describes the development and codification of the Frye and
Daubert expert standards in trials. Part II demonstrates that gang
expert testimony is “social scientific” in nature and experts must
be scrutinized under the Frye or Daubert standard depending on
the jurisdiction of the offense. Part III uses a case study to
demonstrate the flawed logic courts employ when refusing to apply
Frye and Daubert in state gang cases. Part IV demonstrates that
the evidence police experts offer in state gang cases is unreliable
and would fail a Frye or Daubert test, if applied. Part V explores
the impact upon criminal Defendants’ due process rights when
admitting gang “expert” testimony in state gang cases. Finally,
Part VI explores courts’ treatment of DRE in the context of driving
under the influence cases and proposes that like DRE, when police
gang experts cannot fulfill the requirements of Frye and Daubert,
they must be limited to lay-witness observations or excluded
completely.
This is the second article in a three-part series that argues for
adherence to evidentiary standards and a commitment to our due
process protections for all criminal Defendants, including gang
members. The first article contends that the rationale used in
Section 1983 Civil Rights Claims of Monell Bifurcation should be
applied to state gang cases. Specifically, gang evidence should not
be permitted into trial until the trier of fact in criminal trials has
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, guilt of the underlying criminal
offense. This article supplements the previous article by
illuminating a second method of circumventing due process rights
of gang members—not requiring Frye and Daubert expert
standards for police officers’ “expert” testimony.
State gang statutes, patterned after the Federal Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), are part of a
broader move toward complex criminal liability that deprives
criminal Defendants of their due process rights. Like RICO, gang
statutes further expand the prison industrial complex and facilitate
mass incarceration by circumventing well-established expert
standards. Due process protections are eviscerated by state gang
statutes when they allow unduly prejudicial speculation, hearsay
evidence without exception, and unreliable findings. These state
gang statutes have operated to incarcerate poor, young men of
color—seasoned gang member, novice gang member, or simply
the accused gang member—under a different set of legal standards
than the constitution mandates. State gang statues must be
abolished but until then, amended to comply with due process.
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INTRODUCTION
Three days before trial, Detective Phillip Smith began to prepare himself to
testify against KJ.1 KJ was indicted in a 48 co-Defendant, 191 count, state gang
statute and conspiracy case in Baltimore City, Maryland. The Baltimore City State’s
Attorney Office alleged that KJ was a member of the Black Guerrilla Family (BGF). 2
According to the State’s Attorney, BGF dominated and destroyed the Greenmount
area of Baltimore City. After reviewing his materials, Detective Smith decided
photos of KJ’s tattoos were necessary. Detective Smith had no personal contact with
KJ, had never arrested him, monitored him or collected any evidence from him,
including photos of tattoos. Despite Detective Smith’s lack of personal contact with
KJ, based on statements of other officers and confidential informants, he believed
KJ to be a member of the BGF and as a member, believed he would likely have gang
tattoos to prove it. Detective Smith contacted the assigned Assistant State’s Attorney
and proposed going to the jail, where KJ was housed, to take photos of the presumed
tattoos.3 With the approval of the Assistant State’s Attorney, Detective Smith, along

1. See KJ v. Maryland, No. 113310058, 2019 WL 2929034 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 8, 2019). The
facts of the case described here and throughout this paper are derived from the personal knowledge of the
author, Fareed Hayat, who served as KJ’s defense attorney, and the transcripts made available to him. The
case, unpublished, is used in this paper to demonstrate the kind of logic that courts apply when determining
the admissibility of expert witnesses for gang cases. This case is not precedential and is not cited as
precedent in this paper. The client’s full name will be withheld for purposes of this article.
2. The Black Guerrilla Family (BGF) was created as an organization meant to revitalize Black
communities. LA EUSI JAMAA, THE BLACK BOOK: EMPOWERING BLACK FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES,
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/552065/black-guerilla-family-maryland-handbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GV5B-BCM9]. Authorities have labeled the BGF a gang.
3. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the search and seizure of
individuals without a warrant being issue by a neutral magistrate upon the finding of probable cause. In
KJ’s criminal appeal, he argues that the search and collection of photos of his tattoos was a violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, he argues that while inmates have a reduce expectation of
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with three correctional officers,4 forcibly removed KJ from his cell and ordered him
to strip. KJ was given the option to submit to the stripping and photography or to be
forcibly held down while the photos were taken. Based on coercion, 5 KJ submitted
to the demands.
Those photos, taken over KJ’s objection, would become crucial in
determining whether KJ was in fact a member of the BGF, and more importantly
became the basis of Detective Smith’s expertise as it related to KJ’s trial. Those
photos, clear depictions of purported gang symbols, were unlike any of the thousands
of pages previously provided in discovery. Those photos, what they depicted, and
Detective Smith’s “expert” opinion of what they actually suggested about the
psychology, customs, social structures, propensities, thinking, motives and
understanding of gang members, became the strongest evidence against KJ and his
membership in the BGF. “Expert” opinion, of this kind, predictive and scientific in
nature, traditionally requires satisfaction of the stringent Frye and Daubert standards.
Here, Detective Smith’s opinion fell far outside the strict requirements of the wellestablished standard for experts, scientific or otherwise.
Detective Smith initially testified, during his voir dire to qualify as an
expert, that he in fact was an expert in gang member recognition, gang organizational
structure, gang characteristics, and gang activities.6 He claimed to possess
specialized knowledge and skills that enabled him to provide the jury with insight in
determining the ultimate question of KJ’s membership in the BGF and guilt of the
crimes charged in furtherance of the BGF. 7 But, after being subjected to a rigorous
cross examination, Detective Smith admitted that “[under] the true definition of an
expert . . . I would not be an expert. I would be well-versed.”8 He also stated that it
is “impossible” for anyone to be a gang expert. 9 Detective Smith claimed to have
written policies followed by the entire Department of Correction of the State of
Maryland.10 On cross examination, he admitted that he does not remember what year
he wrote such policies and whether the policies were provided in written form,
published in gang investigation networks,11 or ever published in any academic or
peer reviewed journal.12 He admits that he did not include such policies on his 18
page CV,13 and that he would not actually call it a written policy anymore. 14
Detective Smith claimed to have supervised large numbers of gang experts and
privacy, as a pretrial detainee, the Fourth Amendment still provides protection. KJ, 2019 WL 2929034, at
*4.
4. KJ was housed at the Jessup State Prison in Maryland.
5. Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Coerced Confessions and the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 57, 60 (2002) (“When physical or psychological coercion is used to extract a statement, an
unreasonable search and seizure has taken place in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the statement
and its fruit are excludable from trial.”).
6. Transcript of Record at 63, State v. KJ (Md. Cir. Ct. May 19, 2016) (No. 113310058).
7. Id. at 62:112–114.
8. Id. at 45:8–22.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 30:3–15.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 16:22–24, 32–33.
14. Id. at 16:36–37.
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presented “PowerPoint” materials,15 but when ask to describe his supervisory role16
and PowerPoint materials used in the classes he taught,17 he then admitted that his
supervision was “more like conversations” and that he has not provided any such
material.18
Detective Smith claimed to have translated Swahili words and explained
that BGF members use the language to disguise its criminal efforts.19 When asked if
he spoke Swahili and if he knew any of the language beyond the five words he
claimed to translate, he admitted that he didn’t. 20 Detective Smith claimed to have
read the major works of the BGF, 21 its constitution and what he calls the bylaws, but
when asked for copies of those documents and whether he has provided them to
defense, he responded, “no.”22 He offered an opinion on the significance and purpose
of written works, but when asked specific questions beyond his conclusory
statements, he admitted that he had read just some of the works and had not
documented any of his conclusions.23 Detective Smith claimed to have validated
thousands of gang members,24 including BGF members, 25 but when asked if he
provided copies of reports made, the rubric used in coming to his conclusions, or
samples of methods used to ensure accuracy, he responded “no.”26 Detective Smith
testified extensively about the structure of the BGF, 27 but did not bring copies of any
documentation to support his conclusions about the structure.28 Detective Smith is
the quintessential so called “expert”29 in gang cases.
The use of expert testimony like what was provided by Detective Smith in
KJ’s trial, is a powerful tool employed by prosecutors. In recognition of the import
and impact that expert witnesses such as Detective Smith are given in their
testimony, and the weight that jurors give to them—particularly experts that purport
to offer scientific testimony—courts have developed admissibility tests to ensure that
their testimony is reliable.30 In states that follow the expert witness admissibility test

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 16:16–18, 37.
Id. at 16:37.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16:88–89.
Id. at 16:44.
Id. THE BLACK BOOK is a founding work for the Black Guerilla Family. See JAMAA, supra note

2.
22. Id. at 16:45.
23. Id. at 16:44–45.
24. Id. at 16:20.
25. Id. at 16:24.
26. Id. at 16:42, 205–06.
27. Id. at 16:172–73, 189.
28. Id. at 16:191–92.
29. To avoid confusion, the term “expert” is used in this article to refer to police officers that testify
in gang cases and are referred to as experts by the court. However, this article demonstrates that they lack
any reliable expertise in gang member identification, culture, sociology, psychology and should not be
considered experts at all.
30. See Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 385 (Md. 1978) (“Frye was deliberately intended to interpose a
substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new scientific principles . . .
Lay jurors tend to give considerable weight to ‘scientific’ evidence when presented by ‘experts’ with
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laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., any proponent of expert
testimony must demonstrate the reliability of the evidence before it will be admitted
in trial.31 In states that continue to follow the admissibility test laid out in Frye,
proponents of scientific evidence must demonstrate that their positions are accepted
in the relevant scientific community.32
Despite these admissibility standards, numerous courts have permitted
police gang experts to deliver opinions about gang sociology and psychology,
without applying the Frye or Daubert standards. By failing to scrutinize expert
witnesses as the rules of evidence and case law require, courts allow jurors to hear
and accept as true, unvetted, unreliable, junk science that denies criminal Defendants
their Fifth Amendment rights to fair trial.
Real social scientists, sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists have
studied gangs for over a century.33 They are deeply interested in the social
phenomenon of the gang, and whether its members commit crimes or not. When
seeking to define, identify or categorize individuals as gang members, social
scientists perform scientific inquiry where: “(1) the issues investigated must be
theoretically grounded; (2) the research should be based on empirical observation or
be subject to empirical validation . . . ; (3) the research design must be appropriate to
the questions asked; and (4) the proposed research must advance our understanding
of social processes [or social] structures.”34 Despite their extensive expertise in
studying gangs, social scientists are often excluded as experts in gang cases.35
In contrast, police officers have never truly studied gangs from a critical
and unbiased position. Police officer designation as “experts” and their study of
gangs only date back to the 1980’s with the expansion of the so-called “War on
Drugs.”36 In fact, gang “experts” that testify in many state gang trials are simply
police officers who investigate, arrest and interact with alleged gang members.

impressive credentials”); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (“Unlike an
ordinary witness . . . an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not
based on firsthand knowledge or observation . . . Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of
firsthand knowledge . . . is premised on an assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis
in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.”).
31. See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
32. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
33. Zachariah D. Fudge, Gang Definitions, How do They Work?: What the Juggalos Teach Us About
the Inadequacy of Current Anti-Gang Law, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 979, 998 (2014). See also FREDERICK M.
THRASHER, THE GANG: A STUDY OF 1,313 GANGS IN CHICAGO (1927).
34. Div. of Soc. and Econ. Scis., Funding: Sociology, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., https://
www.nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=5369 (alteration in original) [https://perma.cc/5A828FU2].
35. See Christopher McGinnis & Sarah Eisenhart, Interrogation is not Ethnography: The Irrational
Admission of Gang Cops as Experts in the Field of Sociology, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 111,
125 (2010) (“According to some sociologists, these universal assertions gang experts make are
questionable: ‘[b]y relying on other law enforcement agencies’ criteria for identifying gang members,
research indicating that individual gangs can be, and often are, quite unique has been ignored.’ Several
criminal Defendants have offered Malcolm Klein, a sociologist who studies gangs, as an expert in the area
of gangs (his services have never been sought by a prosecutor). Klein’s testimony is often excluded on
the grounds that it is irrelevant because he does not have experience with the gang at bar. In other words,
many courts consider his testimony irrelevant because it is too universal.”).
36. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
.

202

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 51; No. 1

Rather than having a neutral, scientific, interest in gangs that produces unbiased
opinions, police gang experts are concerned only with “criminal” or “delinquent”
gangs37 and prosecution. They collect names, photos, interview individuals
(presumed gang members and informants) and identify what they believe to be
membership, psychology, customs, policies and structures of street gangs. In this
process, police gang experts often fabricate their investigation and falsely identify
individuals as gang members, when they are not.38 Police officer “experts” in gang
cases offer testimony that is sociological and psychological in nature, including
testimony about indicators that an individual is in a gang and testimony about gang
members likely reaction to certain events.39 Yet their “expertise” is not based on any
principles of psychology or sociology, but rather their time on the streets
interacting—as law enforcement officials sent to make arrests, not neutral
observers—with those individuals they believe to be gang members.40 Rather than

37. Fudge, supra note 33.
38. See, e.g., Kevin Rector, Richard Winton & Ben Poston, Three More LAPD Officers Charged
With Falsifying Information in Gang Labeling Scandal, THE L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2020),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-10-02/three-more-lapd-officers-charged-with-falsifyinginformation-in-gang-labeling-scandal [https://perma.cc/6LZV-CXXW] (examining how three Los
Angeles police officers face charges for allegedly falsely identifying people as gang members or
associates); 3 LAPD Officers Charged With Falsifying Information on Gang Affiliation, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Jul. 10,
2020), https://www.dailynews.com/2020/07/10/3-lapd-officers-charged-with-falsifying-information-ongang-affiliation/ [https://perma.cc/WE2L-GQNZ] (examining how officers Braxton Shaw, Michael
Coblentz and Nicolas Martinez each face one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, and multiple counts
of filing false police reports and preparing false documentary evidence).
39. See, e.g., Utz v. Commonwealth, 505 S.E.2d 380, 387–388 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing gang
expert testimony by an officer that defines a gang based on factors similar to those in K.J.); United States
v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1564–65 (10th Cir. 1992) (allowing police officer to testify to the philosophy
of gang membership); People v. Valdez, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135, 139–141 (Ct. App. 1997) (demonstrating
that, in general, where a gang enhancement is alleged, expert testimony concerning the culture, habits,
and psychology of gangs is permissible); People v. Olguin, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601 (Ct. App. 1995)
(allowing police officer expert testimony based on their personal observations and discussions, including
testimony regarding gang psychology and likely reactions to certain events); People v. Gamez, 286
Cal.Rptr. 894, 896, 899 (Ct. App. 1991) (featuring police officers’ expert testimony that attempted murder
was retaliation for prior shooting, and that they determined suspect to be a gang member based on a hand
symbol and “writings”); People v. McDaniels, 166 Cal. Rptr. 12, 14 (Ct. App. 1980) (involving police
officer testimony to the customs and practices of gangs, and testimony as to the type of fight that would
occur if a gang member traveled to a rival gang’s territory).
40. See, e.g., People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 717 (Cal. 1996) (“[I]nvestigations of hundreds of
gang-related offenses, conversations with defendants and other Family Crip members, as well as
information from fellow officers, and various law enforcement agencies” was sufficient to prove that the
primary purpose of the Family Crip gang was to sell narcotics); People v. Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251, 264
(Ct. App. 2011) (“Chaplin testified he had been a police officer for about 15 years and had been assigned
to the San Francisco Police Department’s gang task force for approximately six years. As a gang task
force inspector, he patrolled gang neighborhoods, made contact with gang members whenever possible,
and investigated hundreds of gang crimes including shootings, attempted murders, assaults, and narcotics
sales . . . . Chaplin received on-the- job training from other police officers regarding Bayview street gangs,
including information about investigating gang crime in the Bayview. Chaplin also routinely talked to
officers at the Bayview police station about current trends, ‘things that are going on’ with African–
American gangs and graffiti the officers had seen. In the past six years Chaplin had become familiar with
Bayview gang-related graffiti and tattoos, and had spoken with members of West Mob and Big Block.”);
People v. Barajas, 749 N.E.2d 1047, 1056–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (“Echeverria’s testimony was based on
over eight years of interviewing citizens, gang members, and police officers.”).
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using a verifiable scientific method or established standards for statistical analysis,
they use “factor tests”41 or simply state conclusions that are sociological and
psychological in nature and, often times, are fabricated or simply wrong. 42 Their
methods and conclusions lack reliability, reproducibility, and acceptance in the
relevant scientific community.
Police gang experts, quite frankly, are not experts at all. What they offer by
way of opinion testimony in state gang criminal trials is the equivalent of modern
day “armchair” anthropology—pseudo-science43—that amounts to violations of
criminal Defendants’ due process rights to fair trials.
This article proposes that even after substantive criminal matters have been
resolved by a guilty finding, police gang “expert” testimony should be required to
abide by well-established rules of evidence to ensure criminal Defendants’ due
process of law. This article builds on arguments made in an earlier article in this
series, contending that the rationale used in Section 1983 Civil Rights claims
applying Monell bifurcation, should be adopted in state gang cases. Specifically,
gang evidence, and expert testimony should not be permitted before the jury in
criminal trials until guilt of the substantive criminal offense has been found by the
trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt. 44
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I provides an overview of lay-witness
and expert witness admissibility standards, then describes the development and
codification of the Frye and Daubert expert standards. Part II demonstrates that gang
expert testimony is “social science” in nature and gang experts must be scrutinized
under Frye and Daubert standards. Part III uses a case study, People v. Hill, to
demonstrate the flawed logic courts employ when refusing to apply Frye and
Daubert in state gang case prosecutions. Part IV demonstrates that the evidence
police experts offer in state gang cases is unreliable and would fail a Frye or Daubert
test, if applied. Part V explores the impact upon criminal Defendants’ due process
rights when admitting gang “expert” testimony in state gang case prosecutions.

41. See, e.g., Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 260 (“[The gang expert] explained the 11 criteria formulated
by the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office and the San Francisco Police Department to determine
whether a person is a member of a Bayview African-American gang. [The gang expert] said a person must
meet two or more of those criteria to be listed as a gang member.” (alteration in original)); see also excerpt
from KJ’s trial infra Section IV.
42. See, e.g., Stella Chan, Prosecutors Say Three LAPD Officers Falsified Gang Information, CNN
(Jul. 10, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/10/us/los-angeles-police-officers-charged/index.html
[https://perma.cc/R9PZ-JT5B] (“‘In some instances, the defendants are accused of writing on the card that
a person admitted to being a gang member even though body-worn camera video showed the defendants
never asked the individual about their gang membership,’ the statement says, while in other instances,
‘the defendants allegedly wrote on the card that a person admitted to being a gang member despite the
fact the person interviewed denied a gang affiliation.’”).
43. Pseudo-scientific anthropology and other false sciences were widespread in the 19th and early
20th century. Largely, Europeans would formalize opinions based on the personal ethnocentric opinions
of native peoples across the world. These opinions would be used to justify racist policies and colonialism
that devalued native cultures and people. With the advent of real social sciences, pseudo-sciences were
debunked and dismissed from critical thought. See generally KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE
CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010)
(detailing the evolution in scientific understanding of Blackness and criminality over time).
44. Fareed Nassor Hayat, Preserving Due Process: Applying the Monell Bifurcation to State Gang
Cases, 88 UNIV. OF CINCINNATI L. REV. 129, 136 (2019).
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Finally, Part VI explores courts’ treatment of Drug Recognition Experts (DRE) and
proposes that like DRE, police gang experts whose testimony cannot fulfill the
requirements of Frye or Daubert must be limited to lay-witness observations or
excluded completely.
THE BROADER POLITICAL AND RACIAL CONTEXT
This article focuses specifically on the due process violations of criminal
Defendants accused under state gang statutes when police officers testify as experts
at their trials. This is not an isolated issue, but rather part of a broad practice by
courts, legislators and prosecutors in denying due process of law to criminal
Defendants, especially Black men and other disenfranchised groups.
Many scholars have highlighted how courts fail to apply proper
admissibility standards for expert witnesses in criminal cases generally, and in
particular where the Defendants are members of a minority group. For example,
Jennifer D. Oliva and Valena E. Beety recently condemned the admission of junk
“bite mark” science against criminal Defendants, especially lesbians and other sexual
minorities.45 Oliva and Beety noted in their paper that while the evidentiary rules for
forensic evidence in civil and criminal cases are identical “judges presiding over
criminal cases routinely admit unreliable forensic expert evidence that fails to
comport with the applicable evidentiary rules and that those very same judges reject
in civil cases.”46 Professor Ion Meyn has argued, with significant empirical evidence,
that the growing divide between the rules applied in civil cases compared to
application of procedural rules in criminal cases, are intentional and rooted in Jim
Crow politics rendering Black Defendants vulnerable to state oppression.47
Other scholars have specifically explored the leniency that is given to police
officers who testify as experts in criminal trials on other topics, as well as the
widespread failure to apply Frye and Daubert to police officer testimony generally.48
In addition, a number of articles have been written connecting the political
motivations relating to the so-called War on Drugs with the increasing use of police

45. See generally Jennifer D. Oliva & Valena E. Beety, Regulating Bite Mark Evidence: Lesbian
Vampires and Other Myths of Forensic Odontology, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1769 (2019).
46. Id. at 1771.
47. Ion Meyn, Constructing Separate and Unequal Courtrooms 45 (Univ. of Wis. Legal Studies
Research
Paper
No.
1600),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=365
7250&download=yes [https://perma.cc/D65J-W7KK]; see also Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal
Procedure Are So Different: A Forgotten History, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 697 (2017).
48. See, e.g., Henry F. Fradella, The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of Behavioral Science
Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 403, 444 (2003) (finding that law enforcement officer testimony is the one
area in which Daubert is not being rigorously applied to behavioral science testimony); Brian R. Gallini,
To Serve and Protect? Officers as Expert Witnesses in Federal Drug Prosecutions, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 363 (2012) (finding that when law enforcement officers are qualified as expert witnesses in federal
drug prosecutions, it results in the jury hearing unreliable evidence); Wes R. Porter, Repeating, yet
Evading Review: Admitting Reliable Expert Testimony in Criminal Cases Still Depends Upon who is
Asking 36 RUTGERS L. REC. 48, 49 (noting that some trial courts still exclude experts with reliable
information while allowing police office testimony that is irrelevant, unhelpful, and unfairly prejudicial);
D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on
the Dock? 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (finding a large disparity between rejection of defense experts versus police
officers testifying for the prosecution).
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officer “experts” in criminal cases.49 Prominent scholars have demonstrated that the
so-called War on Drugs has largely eviscerated Fourth Amendment protections for
Black men and other men of color, resulting in the United States’ alarmingly high
prison rates.50
This article asserts that the failure to apply the well-established rules of
evidence to gang experts in criminal trials continues the evisceration of other
constitutional rights, supports the prison industrial complex and facilitates the mass
incarceration of Black men. The willingness of judges, legislators and prosecutors to
ignore constitutional protections, principles of justice and any semblance of equality,
continues to demonstrate that “Black Lives” don’t “Matter.” Failure to equally
follow the rules of evidence in all criminal and civil matters delegitimizes the
criminal justice system and provides tangible basis for the movements to defund
police, prisons and abolish the system as we know it.
Thus, while presented under a due process framework, this paper highlights
a significant equal protection violation. The people charged under state gang statutes
are disproportionately African American. 51 These Defendants—who the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect—are being
denied the trial rights guaranteed to other Defendants both in criminal and civil cases.
This paper acknowledges the existence of an equal protection violation, but does not
follow an equal protection analysis given the barrier that the Supreme Court erected
to bringing equal protection claims in Washington v. Davis, which has been critiqued
by other scholars.52
Within the broader contexts of mass incarceration of young men of color
and the unequal application of the rules of evidence to certain parties, this paper
highlights one more way in which the due process rights of Black men are routinely
denied, with devastating consequences.

I.

AN OVERVIEW OF EXPERT WITNESSES AND THE FRYE AND
DAUBERT EXPERT STANDARDS

The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) make an important distinction
between lay and expert witnesses. Under FRE Rule 701, a lay-witness is limited to
testimony that is based on their actual perception of an event (i.e. witnessing through
49. See, e.g., Michael D. Blanchard & Gabriel J. Chin, Identifying the Enemy in the War on Drugs:
A Critique of the Developing Rule Permitting Visual Identification of Indescritpt White Power in
Narcotics Prosecutions, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 557 (1998); Joelle A. Moreno, Strategies for Challenging
Police Drug Jargon Testimony, 20 CRIM. JUST. 28 (2006); Zach Goldstein, Expert Witnesses in Illegal
Drug Distribution Charges, GOLDSTEIN MEHTA LLC (Feb. 10, 2018), https://goldsteinmehta.com
/blog/expert-witnesses-drug-cases [https://perma.cc/DR5F-GQ3X].
50. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2012) (detailing in great depth the
racial disparities in policing and incarceration in the United States).
51. Jordan Blair Woods, Systemic Racial Bias and RICO’s Application to Criminal Street and Prison
Gangs, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 303, 329–30 (2012).
52. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). For a critique of the “intent” requirement, see
Angela Onwuachi-Willig’s article From Loving v. Virginia to Washington v. Davis: The Erosion of the
Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Intent Analysis, 25 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 303, 307 (2018)
(“Washington v. Davis dealt a devastating blow to the future of civil rights litigation: its intent requirement
essentially made it impossible for plaintiffs to prove an equal protection violation.”).
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the five senses).53 In contrast, FRE Rule 702 states that a witness qualified as an
expert may offer testimony in the form of opinion. 54 However, the rule further states
that—for all experts—the testimony must be based on sufficient facts or data; the
testimony must be the product of reliable principles and methods; and the expert has
reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Different states
have adopted their own versions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. These rules have
corollaries in the different state rules of evidence, which reflect similar principles. 55
If a person does not meet the qualifications of an expert witness, they may testify
only as a lay-witness, and thus testify only about events that they personally
perceived, without offering an opinion about those events. In Frye and Daubert the
D.C. Court of Appeals and U.S. Supreme Court, respectively, placed further limits
on the admission of expert testimony by requiring a certain standard of scientific
acceptability and reliability.
Frye applies to scientific expert evidence specifically. Scientific evidence
refers to opinion testimony based on generally accepted scientific methods.56
Scientific method refers to a process where a phenomenon is observed, theories are
then posed to explain the phenomenon, and lastly theories continuously undergo
testing.57 Frye requires that the proponent of scientific expert testimony prove that
the testimony is based in scientific processes and methodologies that are “generally
accepted” within specific scientific communities.58 “Generally accepted” refers to
the scientific communities’ acceptance of the method and processes as both having
reliability and validity.59 Reliability refers to the scientific theories’ “consistency, or
reproducibility.”60 Validity refers to “the extent to which something measures what
it purports to measure.”61 Without general acceptance of the scientific method, the
evidence is not found credible, and thus is excluded.62

53. FED. R. EVID. 701 (“If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion
is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly
understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”).
54. FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.”).
55. The jurisdictions discussed in this paper have adopted rules of evidence regarding lay and expert
witnesses that are very similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence. See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 800–01
(West 2009); MD. R. EVID. 5-701–02.
56. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235, 238 (2009) (“We must address the application of Frye–Reed
to theories proffered as science and alleged to have been premised on scientifically accepted
methodologies.”).
57. Id. at 239 (citing DAVID L. FAIGMAN, MICHAEL J. SAKS, JOSEPH SANDERS & EDWARD K. CHENG,
1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 263-64 (2008)).
58. Id. at 241–42.
59. Id. at 240.
60. Id. at 241 (“If each time a person steps on to a bathroom scale it gives a different reading (while
the person’s weight has not changed), then the scale is said to lack reliability.”).
61. Id. at 240.
62. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978) (excluding voice analysis software due to unreliability).
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A separate admissibility test referred to as the “Daubert” standard comes
from the Supreme Court case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993). Daubert derives from FRE 702, which Daubert held superseded the Frye test
in the federal context.63 FRE 702 and Daubert require that the scientific evidence be
“reliable.”64 “Reliable” scientific evidence refers to the “trustworthiness” of the
evidence,65 which the judge determines considering the following factors: (1)
“whether [the] theory or technique . . . can be (and has been) tested;”66 (2) “whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;”67 (3) “the
known or potential rate of error;”68 (4) “the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique’s operation;”69 and, (5) “general acceptance” within the
relevant scientific community.70 The test is considered flexible.71 Where the judge
finds the evidence lacks “reliability” the judge may deny the admission of the
evidence.72 Unlike Frye, the admissibility of the evidence is not contingent on the
scientific communities’ acceptance of the evidence. Rather, under Daubert the
judge’s determination of the “reliability” dictates whether the evidence is
admissible.73
In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael74 the Supreme Court expanded
Daubert’s reach significantly, holding that the reliability standard applies not just to
scientific testimony but all expert testimony.75 Specifically, the Kumho Tire Court
opined:
63. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (“Petitioners’ primary attack,
however, is not on the content but on the continuing authority of the rule. They contend that the Frye test
was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We agree.”).
64. Id. at 589 (“[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”).
65. Id. at 590 n.9 (“We note that scientists typically distinguish between ‘validity’ (does the principle
support what it purports to show?) and ‘reliability’ (does application of the principle produce consistent
results?) . . . . [O]ur reference here is to evidentiary reliability—that is, trustworthiness.”).
66. Id. at 593.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 594.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (“The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one.”); see also Benedi v.
McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1384 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Daubert clearly vests the district courts with
discretion to determine the admissibility of expert testimony.”).
72. See Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1153 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Benedi, 66 F.3d at 1384).
73. Robert J. Goodwin, Fifty Years of Frye in Alabama: The Continuing Debate over Adopting the
Test Established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 35 CUMB. L. REV. 231, 233–34 (2004)
(contrasting Frye’s approach to scientific evidence with the Daubert test).
74. 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (“In Daubert, this Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes
a special obligation upon a trial judge to ‘ensure that any and all scientific testimony . . . is not only
relevant, but reliable.’ The initial question before us is whether this basic gatekeeping obligation applies
only to ‘scientific’ testimony or to all expert testimony. We, like the parties, believe that it applies to all
expert testimony.”).
75. Id. (“To say this is not to deny the importance of Daubert’s gatekeeping requirement. The
objective of that requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make
certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience,
employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert
in the relevant field. Nor do we deny that, as stated in Daubert, the particular questions that it mentioned
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We conclude that Daubert’s general principles apply to the expert
matters described in Rule 702. The Rule, in respect to all such
matters, “establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.” It
“requires a valid . . . connection to the pertinent inquiry as a
precondition to admissibility.” And where such testimony’s
factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are
called sufficiently into question . . . the trial judge must determine
whether the testimony has “a reliable basis in the knowledge and
experience of [the relevant] discipline.”76
In short, after Kumho Tire, all experts, including gang experts, must have a reliable
basis upon which to form their opinion.
Despite the ruling in Daubert, and extension in Kumho Tire, states remain
divided over the applicability of Frye’s “generally accepted standard” and Daubert’s
“reliability” standard.77 Most states follow Daubert.78 Others continue to apply Frye,
including California and Illinois, and until recently Maryland. 79 Those jurisdictions
that follow Frye, in particular California, are given specific emphasis in this paper
because unlike states that follow Daubert and Kumho Tire, these states continue to
treat scientific expert testimony differently than non-scientific expert testimony. For
these states it is particularly important to understand why gang expert testimony is
scientific in nature. This is discussed in more detail below. A handful of states
employ a hybrid of both, or have developed their own test.80
II.

THE APPLICABILITY OF FRYE AND DAUBERT TO GANG
EVIDENCE: GANG EVIDENCE AS SCIENCE

The substance and methodology of gang expert testimony in state gang
prosecutions is social scientific in nature and thus, should be subjected to the
stringent requirements of Frye81 and Daubert.82 State prosecutors’ use and State
Court’s admission of gang expert testimony does not comply with Frye, and results
in: (1) diminished expert evidentiary standards; (2) unreliable gang expert findings;

will often be appropriate for use in determining the reliability of challenged expert testimony. Rather, we
conclude that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go
about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable. That is to say, a trial court should
consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of
expert testimony.”).
76. Id.
77. Michael Morganstern, Daubert v. Frye: A State by State Comparison, THE EXPERT INST.,
https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/daubert-v-frye-a-state-by-state-comparison/
(last
updated Sept. 2, 2020).
78. Alice B. Lustre, Post–Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert
Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453, 453 (2001).
79. Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1, 236 A.3d 630 (2020), reconsideration denied (Sept. 25, 2020)
(holding that pretrial hearing under principles set forth under Daubert was required for court to consider
whether expert used reliable methodology in forming her causation opinion; overruling Reed v. State, 283
Md. 374, 382, 391 A.2d 364).
80. Id.
81. Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
82. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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and (3) limitations on criminal Defendants’ ability to effectively confront and
challenge a gang expert’s impact.
Following the decision in Kumho, all expert testimony is subject to the
Daubert test.83 Thus, in the 25 states that follow Daubert,84 all police officers
admitted as “gang experts” must show that their methods of gang identification are
reliable under the test laid out in Daubert.
For states that follow Frye, the issue becomes whether gang evidence is
science. The Supreme Court has stated that science is distinguished from other fields
based on the use of the scientific method, which is based on generating hypotheses
and testing them empirically to see if they can be falsified.85 Gang expert testimony
fits squarely within this definition. Police officer experts use certain criteria to
determine whether a person is in a gang, and these criteria can be falsified depending
on whether people who meet these criteria are always gang members.86 As described
in Part II, police officers in gang cases offer testimony about the general sociology
of gangs and use their observations to form specific conclusions about members’
mental state and rationale for taking particular action as it relates to gang crime.87
Social scientists have been studying gangs for years. 88 Social science as a
discipline demonstrates that the study and understanding of gang culture is science.
Social scientists who study gangs use ethnography—a tool of study, which relies on
interviews and observations—to determine how gangs live, function, and practice.89
Most importantly, social scientists study gangs not from the vernacular of police
officers—the most common “gang experts”—but from a scientific viewpoint that is
based on testing of theories, objective observation, and grounded in years of study
and research.90 Social scientists’ study of gangs includes theories relating to what

83. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
84. See Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post–Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and
Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453 § 2 (2001).
85. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
86. See Rector et al. supra note 38; L.A. DAILY NEWS, supra note 38; Chan, supra note 42.
87. See, e.g., People v. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 894, 896, (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (describing police
officer testimony regarding the structures of gangs and that the attempted murder was committed in
retaliation for a prior shooting); People v. Valdez, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135, 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(describing police officer testimony that at scene of a fight, each person was there to support other gang
members and was acting for the benefit of the gang.).
88. See McGinnis & Eisenhart, supra note 35, at 128–29 (“The gang expert’s testimony on culture
and social relationships purports to have the authority of sociology, a field that tests hypotheses.”); Fudge,
supra note 33, at 989 (“Social scientists have studied gangs for over a century . . . .”).
89. Durán, Robert J., Ethnography and the Study of Gangs, in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Henry Pontell ed., 2018) (“The study of gangs has emerged
alongside the use of a research methodology known as ethnography. Ethnography is based on participant
observation and interviews to provide a detailed description of a wide variety of social groups and
settings.”)
90. McGinnis & Eisenhart, supra note 35, at 129 (“Sociology is recognized as a field in which the
scientific method operates. The National Science Foundation funds sociological research and holds those
projects it funds to high standards familiar to other areas of scientific inquiry: ‘1) [t]he issues investigated
must be theoretically grounded; 2) [t]he research should be based on empirical observation or be subject
to empirical validation; 3) [t]he research design must be appropriate to the questions asked; 4) [t]he
proposed research must advance our understanding of social processes or social structures.’” (quoting
NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SOCIOLOGY PROGRAM – DOCTORAL DISSERTATION RESEARCH IMPROVEMENT
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constitute a gang, what are the normative behaviors of the gang, and what are
identifying features of the gang and gang members.91 Even as they decline to apply
the Frye test, some courts have explicitly recognized that gang evidence is rooted in
sociology and psychology,92 which are both social sciences.93
In People v. Hill, the California Court of Appeals offered an in-depth
analysis of the scientific nature of gang expert testimony. The court conceded that
the police officer’s testimony regarding the Defendant’s alleged gang membership,
gang culture, and the gang motivation to kill police officers and rival gang members
was considered gang “sociology and psychology.”94 The court went on to compare
gang testimony to the socio-scientific evidence that courts have considered in cases
involving “rape trauma syndrome” and “battering and its effects.”95
“Rape trauma syndrome” includes the observation of response patterns
which are incongruous with the behavior in the general public perception concerning
rape.96 This phenomena has led to the scientific theory—“rape trauma syndrome”—
that theorizes that despite the rape survivors “incongruous” behavior, the behavior is
still consistent with the behavior of a victim of rape. 97 “Battering and its effects”
includes observation of spousal abusers’ repeated “battering cycles” that leaves the
abused spouse more sensitive over time to the violence and eventually unable to cope
with the abuse resulting in the abused spouse’s violence against the abuser. 98 The

AWARDS (SOC-DDRI): PROGRAM SOLICITATION, NSF 14-604 (2014), https://www.nsf.gov
/pubs/2014/nsf14604/nsf14604.pdf [https://perma.cc/77PM-L3FH]).
91. Fudge, supra note 33, at 990–91 (“While twenty-first century gangs differ in some respects from
the gangs of pre-war Chicago, contemporary sociologists largely continue to define gangs along similar
lines. Gang definitions are highly variable and often fairly complex.”); K. Babe Howell, Fear Itself: The
Impact of Allegations of Gang Affiliation on Pre-Trial Detention, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 620, 622 (2011)
(“While legal academics have left the intersection of gang policing and the criminal justice system largely
unexplored, social scientists and sociologists have long focused on the nature of gangs, the different levels
of affiliation, and the difficulty of defining both ‘gangs’ and ‘membership’ in a gang.”).
92. People v. Gonzales, 135 P.3d 649, 657 (Cal. 2006) (upholding police officer testimony that gang
members would definitely intimidate a witness called to testify, finding that the testimony was “quite
typical of the kind of expert testimony regarding gang culture and psychology that a court has discretion
to admit”); People v. Olguin, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“The use of expert testimony
in the area of gang sociology and psychology is well established.”); People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713,
726 (Cal. 1996) (first citing Olguin, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602; then citing People v. Gamez, 235 Cal. App.
3d 957, 966 (noting that case law has upheld expert police officer testimony in the field of gang sociology
and psychology); and then citing People v. McDaniels, 166 Cal. Rptr. 12, 15, 107 Cal. App. 3d 898, 903
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (referring to police officer’s testimony in gang cases “relating to the sociology and
psychology of gangs”)); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
93. See generally What Is Sociology? UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL (2020),
https://sociology.unc.edu/undergraduate-program/sociology-major/what-is-sociology/
[https://perma.cc/QX3G-X9Q3]; Saul McLeod, What is Psychology? SIMPLY PSYCH. (2019),
https://www.simplypsychology.org/whatispsychology.html [https://perma.cc/E7QU-RUV3].
94. People v. Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
95. This is sometimes referred to in case-law and literature as Battered Woman Syndrome. See, e.g.,
Jessica Savage, Battered Woman Syndrome, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 761 (2006).
96. See 12 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d §§ 3, 5 (1991) (explaining rape trauma syndrome).
97. See generally State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 440, 441 (2004) (explaining the syndrome of
battering and its effects). Courts have applied Frye or similar admissibility standards to “battering and its
effects.” Id.
98. Id. 441–42.
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observation of this phenomena has led to the scientific theory—”battering and its
effects”—that is used to explain why the abused spouse “eventually react[s] by
killing [their] spouse.”99 Courts have routinely applied Frye or similar admissibility
criteria to expert testimony on “battering and its effects” and “rape trauma
syndrome,” though they may diverge on whether the theory had gained the requisite
general acceptance in the relevant field.100
Police gang expert testimony, like “battering and its effects” and “rape
trauma syndrome,” is social scientific evidence because gang expert testimony, like
the syndromes, relies on the expert’s observation that are later used to construct a
theory, which might explain the Defendant’s behavior. Specifically, like the
observation of “response patterns” and the “cycle of violence” in “battering and its
effects,” the police gang experts testimony is based on observations of gang activity
that occurs during the investigation, arrests, and interviews for suspected gang
related offenses.101 For example, during KJ’s case, Detective Smith testified that he
had interacted with over 300 BGF members, read BGF bylaws and constitutions, and
conducted surveillance on areas where the gang was suspected.102 Likewise, in Hill
the gang expert’s evidence was based on “contact with gang members” made through
patrol work, investigation, and conversation with other officers.103

99. Id. at 442 (“One aspect of this was the attempt by criminal defense lawyers to offer this syndrome
in support of a self-defense argument when the woman eventually reacted by killing her abuser, and one
finds a burgeoning plethora of cases in the 1980’s and 1990’s in which courts were required to deal with
the issue.”).
100. See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 637–39 (D.C. 1979) (applying Frye to
battered woman syndrome); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 797–99 (Minn. 1989) (acknowledging
that battered woman syndrome has gained sufficient scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 2001); State v. Grecinger 569
N.W.2d 189, 194, 196 (Minn. 1997) (admitting expert testimony on battered woman syndrome based on
the finding that it had gained sufficient acceptance in the scientific community); State v. Marks, 647 P.2d
1292, 1299 (Kan. 1982) (applying Frye to Rape Trauma Syndrome); People v. Bledsoe 681 P.2d 291,
297–301 (Cal. 1984) (excluding evidence of rape trauma syndrome based on the finding that it was not
generally accepted in its scientific community for the specific purpose it was being offered); Henson v.
State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1193–94 (Ind. 1989) (admitting evidence of rape trauma syndrome based on prior
finding of general acceptance in the relevant scientific community).
101. People v. Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251, 264 (Ct. App. 2011) (“Chaplin testified he had been a police
officer for about 15 years and had been assigned to the San Francisco Police Department’s gang task force
for approximately six years. As a gang task force inspector, he patrolled gang neighborhoods, made
contact with gang members whenever possible, and investigated hundreds of gang crimes including
shootings, attempted murders, assaults, and narcotics sales . . . . Chaplin received on-the- job training from
other police officers regarding Bayview street gangs, including information about investigating gang
crime in the Bayview. Chaplin also routinely talked to officers at the Bayview police station about current
trends, ‘things that are going on’ with African-American gangs and graffiti the officers had seen. In the
past six years Chaplin had become familiar with Bayview gang-related graffiti and tattoos, and had spoken
with members of West Mob and Big Block.”); People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 717, 726 (Cal. 1996)
(deeming expert testimony based on “investigation of hundreds of gang-related offenses, conversations
with defendants and other Family Crip members, as well as information from fellow officers, and various
law enforcement agencies,” sufficient to prove that the primary purpose of the Family Crip gang was to
sell narcotics); People v. Barajas, 749 N.E.2d 1047, 1056–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (“Echeverria’s testimony
was based on over eight years of interviewing citizens, gang members, and police officers.”).
102. Transcript of Record, supra note 6, at 16:11–18:85.
103. Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 264.
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Police gang experts, like psychologists studying syndromes, then use their
observation to develop theories based on patterns or frequencies they observed in the
form of identifying whether an individual is a gang member, whether a group of
individuals are a gang, and what norms, including criminal activity, the gang
embraces.104 Just as syndrome evidence is based off observing “response patterns”
and “cycles of violence,” police gang experts base their testimony on their experience
in investigating gang crime in creating theories of gang membership, structure, and
norms.105 In KJ’s case, Detective Smith used a list of 12 factors, allegedly made
through his study of BGF, that would determine who was a gang member. 106
Likewise in Hill a similar list of factors was used to determine whether the Defendant
was a “West Mob” member.107 In Utz v. Commonwealth,108 the police officers
explained that they defined a gang based not on 12 factors, but on five criteria,
including having five or more people, a unique name, hand symbols, graffiti,
claiming some type of turf, meeting on a regular basis, and being involved in some
type of illegal activity.
Police officer gang “experts” also use their observations to form specific
hypotheses that purport to allow them into the mind of the suspected gang member.
They use these hypotheses to explain the members’ rationale and thinking for taking
part in particular gang crimes. The police officer gang “expert” testifies about the
Defendant’s potential mindset at the time of the crime, as a psychologist might use
observations about the effects of a syndrome to explain a Defendant’s behavior. For
example, in People v. Gamez, three police officers testified as experts that the
attempted murder was committed as retaliation for a prior shooting, based on their
observations of gang behavior and the observations of other officers in the
department.109 The officers concluded that the Defendant was a gang member based
on similar factors to those used in the KJ case and Hill. In People v. Valez, the police
officer expert opined that at the scene of the fight, each member was there to support
and back up the other members.110 The police expert was permitted to testify to more
104. See Burris v. State, 78 A.3d 371, 373–74 (Md. 2013) (“The State moved, prior to trial, to
introduce the testimony of Sergeant Dennis Workley of the Baltimore City Police Department, proffered
as a gang expert, who would identify Burris as a member of BGF, and testify that BGF was a ‘violent’
gang that would commit murder on the basis of a debt owed to one of its members . . . .” (footnote
omitted)); People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 325 (Cal. 2016) (“Stow testified generally about gang culture,
how one joins a gang, and about the Delhi gang in particular. Gangs have defined territories or turf that
they control through intimidation.”); Ayala v. State, 923 A.2d 952, 957 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007)
(“Photographs seized from Ayala’s home were admitted into evidence through Detective McDonald, who
executed the search warrant on the home. The photographs depicted blue and white clothing with the
number 13 on it, various persons, including Ayala making hand signals and gang-related tattoos on various
persons, including Ayala. Subsequently, the prosecutor showed the photographs to Detective Porter while
he was on the stand. In response to the prosecutor’s questioning, Detective Porter expressed his opinion
that Ayala was a member of MS–13.”).
105. See Burris, 78 A.3d at 373–74; Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 325; Ayala, 923 A.2d at 956–57.
106. Transcript of Record, supra note 6, at 16:39 (such factors included “self-admission,” “guilty by
association, hanging with other gang members, tattoos, clothing, language, other law enforcement
information, documentation, paperwork, pictures, [and] social media.”).
107. Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 260.
108. 505 S.E.2d 380, 387–88 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
109. 286 Cal. Rptr. 894, 896 (Ct. App. 1991).
110. 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135, 140 (Ct. App. 1997).
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than what he observed, which would have been limited to stating that he saw multiple
members on the scene during the altercation. He was permitted to give opinion
testimony that required him to go inside the members’ minds and explain the
psychology of the members on the scene to the jury—specifically why each member
of the caravan acted for the benefit of a street gang during the crime. 111 Similarly in
People v. Gardeley, “the gang expert’s testimony alone, based on ‘investigation of
hundreds of gang-related offenses, conversations with defendants and other Family
Crip members, as well as information from fellow officers, and various law
enforcement agencies,’ was deemed sufficient to prove that the primary purpose of
the Family Crip gang was to sell narcotics.”112
Accordingly, based on the similarity between recognized syndromes (i.e.
the ability to enter the Defendant’s mind, understand their thinking, and then present
their thinking and corresponding actions in a purported credible way), gang expert
testimony is a social science, similar in form and structure to “battering and its
effects” and “rape trauma syndrome.” Because gang evidence is a science,
specifically a social science, Frye and Daubert must apply. However, courts
routinely decline to extend Frye and Daubert to police officer gang expert testimony,
instead allowing the testimony under the federal or state rules of evidence on the
basis that the testimony is relevant and helpful in illuminating points to the jury.113
Though relevance is the basic requirement for all evidence, expert testimony,
especially that which is based in science, requires a further showing of reliability.
III.

UNVETTED SCIENCE: THE CURRENT STANDARD FOR GANG
EXPERT TESTIMONY

Unfortunately for criminal Defendants, when it comes to gang expert
testimony, courts continuously admit gang evidence through police officers qualified
as experts without applying Daubert or Frye.
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Kumho Tire, courts avoided Daubert
by finding that gang expert testimony was specialized knowledge rather than
scientific testimony.114 This logic is problematic because it ignores the sociological
element of testimony regarding the structure of street gangs, and the psychological
element of testifying regarding the psychology of gang members. Additionally,
following Kumho Tire, which held that Daubert was applicable to all expert
testimony, including specialized knowledge, this rationale is no longer viable.
Courts considering police officer gang expert testimony have also
circumvented the Daubert requirement by misconstruing the Daubert decision
language regarding the “flexibility” of the test115 and looking only at the officer’s
credentials and personal knowledge without examining his methodology at all. For
111. Id.
112. McGinnis & Eisenhart, supra note 35, at 118.
113. In People v. Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), the court declines to apply
Daubert to gang expert testimony and concludes that testimony is admissible because it “was directly
relevant to establish the gang purpose alleged in count 4.”
114. See, e.g., Torres v. State, 962 P.2d 3, 21–22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (“Taylor and Daubert are
not applicable to non-scientific evidence, including testimony on the nature and structure of street
gangs.”).
115. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–95 (1993).
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example, in U.S. v. Hankey, the Ninth Circuit considered a Daubert challenge to
gang expert testimony. In that case, police officers had offered testimony that “gangs
enforce a code of silence among their members that any affiliated gang member
would be subject to violent retribution if one gang member testified against another”
and that “if a member of one of the affiliated gangs in the area testified against
another member, the witness would be beaten or killed.”116 The court found that “The
Daubert factors (peer review, publication, potential error rate, etc.) simply are not
applicable to this kind of testimony, whose reliability depends heavily on the
knowledge and experience of the expert, rather than the methodology or theory
behind it.”117 After determining that the Daubert factors were inapplicable, the court
affirmed the trial court’s admission of the officer’s testimony based on his years of
experience as a police officer and his particular focus on gangs.118 The court never
evaluated whether, in all his years as a police officer studying gangs, this expert had
been employing reliable methods to come to sociological conclusions regarding gang
structure or the likely motives of individual members. Similarly, in Nenno v. State,
the Texas Court of Appeals surveyed other court decisions and found agreement that
“the four factors listed in Daubert do not necessarily apply outside of the hard
science context; instead methods of proving reliability will vary, depending upon the
field of expertise.”119
This deference to police officer experts fundamentally misconstrues the test
envisioned by Daubert. The “flexibility” language in Daubert does not mean that
courts can avoid examining the reliability of experts by deferring entirely to their
years of experience and personal observations. In fact, the full text of Daubert’s
discussion of “flexibility” explicitly stated that:
The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible
one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity—and thus the
evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that
underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that
they generate.120
In Kumho Tire, the court confirmed that “Some of [the Daubert] factors
may be helpful in evaluating the reliability even of experience-based expert
testimony.”121 Even assuming, arguendo, that the specific factors of peer review and
error rate may be applied with lower rigor to behavioral science, the general
requirement of reliability is inflexible. Certainly the “flexibility” allowed by Daubert
does not allow courts to avoid a reliability analysis altogether simply because of an
expert’s background. The fact that an expert has been a police officer for many years,
or has worked with gangs, or personally knows a Defendant, does not establish
reliability of methods, in particular when the expert’s career is centered around
116. 203 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2000).
117. Id. at 1169.
118. Id. at 1169–70.
119. 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
120. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95 (emphasis added).
121. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138 (1999).
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arresting people like the Defendant.122 Significantly, an extensive survey of case law
found that law enforcement testimony was the “one area in which Daubert [was] not
being rigorously applied to behavioral science testimony.”123
In states that follow Frye, state prosecutors have successfully circumvented
the Frye requirements by asserting that gang expert testimony is not a science, thus
not required to abide by the stringent standards of Frye. This is concerning because,
as outlined in the previous section of this paper, gang expert testimony is scientific
in nature and depends on psychology and sociology of gang members. Some scholars
have also argued that there is a “soft science” exemption for Frye and that it need
not be applied to testimony that is psychological in nature.124 One of the often cited
cases for this argument is People v. McDonald.125 In McDonald, the California
Supreme Court declined to apply Frye to expert testimony on eyewitness
identification.126 The court found that the risk Frye is meant to address, namely that
jurors may give undue weight to scientific testimony, is particularly present when
the evidence is produced by a machine.127 In contrast, when a witness gives his
opinion on the stand, the jury will be naturally more skeptical. 128 However, in that
same paragraph the court lists the types of novel processes that should be subject to
Frye, and includes “rape trauma syndrome” in that list—a clearly socio-scientific
phenomenon like gang member psychology.
Furthermore, courts should keep sight of the purpose of expert witness
admissibility tests and use them to ensure that the jury is not hearing unsound
evidence that is socio-scientific in nature. The court in People v. McDonald further
emphasizes that the ultimate goal of Frye is to prevent the jury from being misled by
unproven and ultimately unsound scientific methods. 129 This purpose is not served
when sociological and psychological evidence that is clearly based on unreliable
methods is the offered testimony. As Professor Edward J. Imwikelried argues in his
paper The Importance of Daubert in Frye Jurisdictions:
[I]t is one thing to say that in a Frye jurisdiction, the proponent
need not make any showing that the expert’s theory or
methodology is empirically valid. However, it is quite another
matter to say that the testimony should be admitted despite a
showing by the opponent demonstrating the empirical invalidity of

122. There is an inherent risk of bias in the testimony from experts whose careers depend on the
outcome of their analyses. For further discussion of this risk, see Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue:
Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV.
245 (2017).
123. Henry F. Fradella, Adam Fogarty & Lauren O’Neill, The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility
of Behavioral Science Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 403, 444 (2003).
124. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Escape Hatches from Frye and Daubert: Sometimes You
Don’t Need to Lay Either Foundation in Order to Introduce Expert Testimony! 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
1, 6–7 (1999).
125. 690 P.2d 709, 723–24 (Cal. 1984), overruled on other grounds by People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265
(Cal. 2000).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 373.
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the theory or methodology. The Frye test should be conceived as
merely a means to the end of ensuring the reliability of the
testimony submitted to the trier of fact; and in exceptional cases,
in which the opponent can present substantial evidence of the
empirical invalidity of the expert’s theory or technique, it does not
serve that end objective to admit the expert testimony.130
As described above, the argument that Frye does not apply to soft sciences
is not firmly established and does not exempt behavioral science from a reliability
examination. However, even assuming, arguendo, that courts have flexibility around
the application of Frye to soft sciences, this flexibility should not be employed to
allow the jury to hear clearly unreliable sociological and psychological evidence.
Even worse, some courts have recognized that the testimony may be
scientific and still declined to apply Frye based on the flawed logic that prior courts
also did not apply Frye.131 Courts have consistently accepted this view—a close
survey of gang case prosecution reveals that despite the scientific nature of the
evidence presented and courts recognition, Frye has never been applied to gang
expert testimony. However, the testimony is not correspondingly limited: police
officers are still referred to as experts and are allowed to present their “12 factor
method” as a reliable scientific method to the jury, without ever being required to
acknowledge that the process is in fact unscientific and unreliable. People v. Hill is
illustrative of this point, 132 where the Court addressed head-on a challenge to the
admission of gang expert testimony under Frye.133 Hill is instructive in explaining
the court’s ability to bypass the application of Frye even as they recognize that the
testimony rests on scientific conclusions.
A.

People v. Hill: Factual Background

In People v. Hill,134 the Defendant was charged with, among other things,
first degree murder and participation in a criminal street gang in San Francisco,
California.135 The decedent was a police officer that was working in an unmarked
cruiser and in plain-clothes capacity the day of the incident.136 The decedent followed
the Defendant first by foot and then in his unmarked cruiser.137 The State argued that
the decedent had identified himself as a police officer to the Defendant. 138 The
defense argued that the Defendant was not aware that the plain-clothes officer was

130. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of Daubert in Frye Jurisdictions, 42 No. 2 CRIM. L.
BULL. ART 5 (2006).
131. See, e.g., People v. Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251, 256 (Ct. App. 2011) (discussed below).
132. Id. at 268.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 256.
135. Id. at 257 n.2.
136. Id. at 257.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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indeed a police officer.139 Ultimately, the Defendant shot the officer causing his
death.140
Despite the fact that there is no mention of any gang epithets yelled during
the shooting, the State was permitted to call a gang expert to testify, 141 because the
court found that such evidence was relevant to establishing the gang’s purpose. 142
The “expert” was a San Francisco police officer who did not possess a degree in
social science.143 Based on criteria created by the “San Francisco District Attorney’s
Office and the San Francisco Police Department,” the expert identified the Defendant
as part of “West Mob” gang,144 which was in rivalry with “Big Block” gang.145 The
expert further testified that the Defendant, as a member of West Mob, was motivated
to commit the crime because “[r]etaliation against a [rival] gang member sends a
message to other gang members, but the murder of a police officer sends a message
to the community, ‘Hey, even your protectors can be touched.’”146 Further, the expert
testified that it was “‘looked down upon’” to cooperate with the State and that such
conduct was considered “snitching,” that the area where the shooting occurred was
an “area where one ‘would not ever expect to see somebody from West Mob . . . for
any reason other than a gang reason, a shooting or a killing;”‘ and that if the intended
target, i.e. the rival gang member, for a shooting is not present, then “you’re not just
going to turn and run out.” 147 The expert posed a “hypothetical” that the Defendant
as a member of the West Mob gang was intending to commit a shooting that day in
order to retaliate against Big Block for a series of murders of West Mob members.148
Notably, the expert’s “hypothetical” revealed that the Defendant was not intending
to shoot an officer but specifically a Big Block member named Ronnie Allen who
had committed a series of shootings of West Mob members.149 In closing, the State
argued that the Defendant intended to kill the rival gang member, Ronnie Allen, but
killed the decedent officer because he did not want to be arrested for carrying the
assault rifle––the weapon the State argued that the Defendant intended to use on
Allen.150
The defense challenged the admissibility of the expert witness’ testimony
in arguing that the “[s]treet experience and police workshops on investigation
techniques [does not] transform officers into behavioral scientists” and that police
139. Id. at 256.
140. Id. at 257–58.
141. Id. at 259–260.
142. Id. at 282.
143. Id. at 264 (listing the officer’s qualification with no mention of degree in sociology or
psychology).
144. Id. at 260 (“Chaplin explained the 11 criteria formulated by the San Francisco District Attorney’s
Office and the San Francisco Police Department to determine whether a person is a member of a Bayview
African–American gang. Chaplin said a person must meet two or more of those criteria to be listed as a
gang member.”)
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 265.
148. Id. at 260–61.
149. Id. (emphasis added) (“Chaplin opined that appellant’s actions on the night of the April 10
shooting were consistent with a West Mob member retaliating against a Big Block member . . . .”).
150. Id. at 262.
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experience “does not translate into sociological or psychological expertise on gang
members’ intentions, motivations, and actions under specified circumstances.”151
The Hill court dismissed any challenges to credibility of the evidence in stating that
the officers “experience and training demonstrated the special knowledge, skill,
experience and training sufficient to qualify him as an expert in these areas.”152 Hill
further declined to apply Frye, discussed infra.153
B.

People v. Hill: The Expert Testimony Was “Science” Yet The Court Did
Not Apply Frye

As explained above, there is little doubt that the police officer’s testimony
regarding the Defendant’s alleged gang membership, gang culture, and the gang
motivation to kill police officers and rival gang members, was science––the court in
Hill conceded that the testimony was categorized as “[g]ang sociology and
psychology . . . .”154 The court further admitted that gang experts opine on the mental
state of the Defendant, including “motivation for a particular crime” and “whether
and how a crime was committed to benefit or promote a gang.”155
Hills’ reasoning for not applying Frye was perfunctory. The court rejected
the application of Frye in stating that the Defendant “has cited no California authority
for the proposition that a gang expert’s opinion is subject to the Kelly test” (Kelly is
the case which adopted Frye in California)156 “and[] generally speaking, Kelly does
not apply to the type of expert testimony provided by [the gang expert].” 157 Hill did
not elaborate on why Frye, which applies “not only to the more obvious polygraph,
voice print, and blood-typing techniques but also to scientific processes based on
purely psychological evidence,”158 such as hypnosis,159 rape trauma syndrome,160
and child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,161 did not likewise apply to gang

151. Id. at 265.
152. Id. at 265–69 (citing People v. Gonzalez, 135 P.3d 649 (Cal. 2006)).
153. Id. at 259.
154. Id. at 265 (alteration added) (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 124, 132 (Ct. App.
2005)).
155. Id. (quoting People v. Killebrew, 126 Cal Rptr. 2d 876, 885 (Ct. App. 2002)).
156. Kelly is the case that adopted Frye in California. See In re Amber B., 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628 (Ct.
App. 1987) (referring to the test as a “Kelly-Frye” test).
157. Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
158. People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 391, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886, 889 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing
People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982)). In Bowker, the court concluded that Dr. Murphy
constructed a “scientific” framework “into which the jury couldpigeonhole [sic] the facts of the case.
Thus, even though he was precluded from using CSAAS as a predictor of child abuse, the jury was free
to superimpose these children on the same theory and conclude abuse had occurred. The prosecution was
not circumspect in using syndrome evidence as shown by the colloquy between the prosecutor and Dr.
Murphy . . . .” Id. at 892.
159. See Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1374 (determining whether hypnotically recalled testimony is subject to
the California version of the Frye rule).
160. People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 301 (Cal. 1984) (“[Rape trauma syndrome does not meet Frye]
because the literature does not even purport to claim that the syndrome is a scientifically reliable means
of proving that a rape occurred . . . .”).
161. See Bowker, Cal. Rptr. at 890–91 (applying Frye to child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome).
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expert testimony that was admittedly “scientific.” In sum, the court in Hill admitted
that the police officer’s testimony was scientific, but then chose to bypass the Frye
test by treating the gang expert as a non-scientific expert.162
This paper does not conclude that police officers, without sociological or
psychological educational backgrounds, creditable methodologies and verifiable
conclusions are scientific experts, but rather that the testimony proffered is scientific,
or at the bare minimum requires a scientific framework. Hill does little to refute the
claim that the gang expert is scientific: providing no analysis distinguishing gang
evidence from “scientific evidence,” the court simply concluded that Frye did not
apply because the Defendant had not cited to an authority that applies Frye to gang
evidence.163 Such reasoning is contrary to the holding in the namesake for Frye,
which applied the Frye requirements to the introduction of a lie detector test despite
a lack of precedent for doing so. In fact Frye, like Hill, explained that though there
was no precedent on the admissibility of lie detector tests, a relatively novel and
emerging science at the time, the evidence still needed to show “general
acceptance.”164 Thus, the decision in Hill to not apply the Frye standard is simply a
refusal to apply the appropriate standard for scientific evidence without legal basis.
Hill is not unique. In a number of cases, the court has explicitly recognized
that police officer expert testimony is sociological or psychological in nature, yet this
has not led to the application of Frye or Daubert.165
As explained in the next section, the lack of Frye and Daubert for gang
expert testimony is particularly troubling given that the particular testimony offered
by these purported efforts would almost certainly fail both a Daubert reliability test
and a Frye general acceptance test.
IV.

GANG EVIDENCE LACKS RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY AND
FAILS FRYE AND DAUBERT

The below quoted section of Detective Smith’s cross examination in KJ’s
trial demonstrates that gang expert testimony lacks the reliability required by the
rules of evidence, Frye, and Daubert. When challenged, Detective Smith’s
methodology for determining gang membership falls apart.
Detective Smith: I see a lot of guys throwing up the peace sign.
That, in some cases could be an indicator . . . that they’re a part of
BGF.
Counsel: So, my question again for you is, is throwing up a peace
sign an indicator that you’re BGF?

162. Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 268 (“[G]enerally speaking, Kelly does not apply to the type of expert
testimony provided by [the gang expert].”).
163. Id.
164. Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
165. Supra note 92.
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Detective Smith: It could be an indicator but that alone will not
identify an individual as being BGF.
Counsel: So what about the peace sign makes it an indicator of
BGF?
Detective Smith: It’s an indicator because everyone that’s a part of
that group wants to use that particular sign . . . .
Counsel: You said that if they had maybe two of these common
identifiers you could validate them as a BGF member, right?
Detective Smith: Correct.
Counsel: So if they’re associated with BGF members and throw
up a peace sign, you would validate that person as BGF.
Detective Smith: . . . I wouldn’t use . . . that’s not strong. I
wouldn’t validate them for just throwing a peace sign and
associating with BGF members . . . .
Counsel: You said two or more indicators.
Detective Smith: I would not use those two as validating or
labeling a person as a gang member.
Counsel: So there’s . . . certain indicators that don’t add up to BGF,
right?
Detective Smith: In my personal opinion, yes.166
Detective Smith testified that if a person satisfied two of his 12 indicators,
he would validate them as a BGF member. Yet when given a scenario where a
suspected BGF member fulfilled two of his indicators (hand signal and association),
he then concedes that those two indicators would not be sufficient to validate the
suspect as a BGF member. As discussed further below, this is an unreliable and
unverifiable method and fails the Frye and Daubert admissibility tests.
A.

Gang expert testimony lacks general acceptance in the relevant scientific
communities

In order for a gang expert to form a basis and methodology to be accepted
under Frye, it must be “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs.”167 Defining the particular field to which the
evidence belongs is key. “General scientific recognition may not be established
without the testimony of disinterested experts whose livelihood is not intimately

166. Transcript of Record, supra note 6, at 16:204–206.
167. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978).
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connected with the program.”168 General acceptance of gang recognition methods
among police officers is not sufficient to establish general acceptance under Frye––
rather, the methods must be accepted by scientists who study and define gangs from
a neutral, non-prosecutorial standpoint. In the KJ trial, the state could not show that
the gang expert’s testimony was based on reliable evidence and methods. There was
no indication that police officer gang expert testimony had ever been accepted by
disinterested scientists that were not proponents of the program, such as independent
sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, or other social or behavioral scientists.
B.

Gang Expert Testimony Lacks a Credible Factual Basis

Courts have held that an expert’s reasoning and methodology must be
connected to their conclusions, have an adequate factual basis, and be generally
accepted within the relevant scientific community.169 In addition, the “[r]equirement
of an adequate factual basis for expert testimony consists of two distinct sub-factors:
(1) it is first required that the expert have available an adequate supply of data with
which to work, and (2) it is then required that the expert employ a reliable
methodology in analyzing that data.”170 “A factual basis sufficient to support an
expert witnesses’ opinion testimony may arise from a number of sources, such as
facts obtained from the expert’s first-hand knowledge, facts obtained from the
testimony of others, and facts related to an expert through the use of hypothetical
questions.”171
Here, the gang expert in KJ’s trial failed to provide a credible factual basis
for his testimony.172 The gang expert was never a member of the Black Guerrilla
Family and the factual basis he provided for his opinion was based on information
from self-interested parties—the witnesses that he interviewed were either current or
ex-criminals with severely compromised credibility.173 Furthermore, the gang expert
failed to provide copies of the interviews, substance of his investigation, materials
gathered and methodology used in his investigation.174 Such failures prevented KJ
from effectively challenging the conclusions reached by the gang expert and did not
provide an adequate or credible factual basis.

168. People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 376, 255 N.W.2d 171, 180 (Mich. 1977).
169. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235, 253–55 (Md. 2009); see also Roy v. Dackman, 124 A.3d 169,
172 (Md. 2015), reconsideration granted (Nov. 24, 2015) (holding that testimony must constitute more
than mere speculation or conjecture); Giant Good, Inc. v. Booker, 831 A.2d 481, 490 (Md. 2003) (citing
Uhlik v. Kopec, 314 A.2d 732 (1974), cert. denied, 271 Md. 739 (1974)) (“An expert’s opinion testimony
must be based on a [sic] adequate factual basis so that it does not amount to ‘conjecture, speculation, or
incompetent evidence.’”).
170. Dackman, 124 A.3d at 170. FRE 702(b) also requires that the testimony be “based on sufficient
facts or data.”
171. Sippio v. State, 714 A.2d 864, 874 (Md. 1998).
172. Transcript of Record, supra note 6, at 16:42–44.
173. Id. at 16:22:6–14.
174. Id. at 16:42-44.
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Gang Expert Testimony Lacks Reliability and Validity

Under Frye, the testimony offered in the KJ trial would lack “reliability”
and “validity.”175 Reliability refers to the ability to reproduce consistent results: “if
each time a person steps on to a bathroom scale it gives a different reading (while
the person’s weight has not changed), then the scale is said to lack reliability.”176
Validity refers to “the extent to which something measures what it purports to
measure,” or, in other words, “the accuracy of a test, the degree to which a test or
technique provides a true measurement of the phenomenon being assessed.”177
In KJ’s case, Detective Smith failed to specify the methodology he used to
analyze the data collected from those he interviewed. Moreover, the State did not
show both what Detective Smith’s methodology was and why that methodology was
reliable, in order to admit him as an expert witness.178
Reliability of the rubric used to determine gang membership would mean
that “each time a person” met two or more factors, then the individual would be a
BGF member. But in KJ’s case, Detective Smith admitted that even if two factors
were present, the person may not be a member. 179 In other words, the evidence
showed “a lack of reliability” in that when two factors were presented, the results
were different than what was expected.180 The evidence also lacked validity for the
same reason––the factors that Detective Smith used were meant to measure gang
membership, yet an individual can show two factors—thus satisfying the criteria—
and still not be a BGF member.
Additionally, Detective Smith himself was not qualified to offer reliable
testimony––he testified to attending training sessions for his knowledge of gang
expertise but did not specify where, with who or what specific materials were
covered.181 The testimony offered by these purported experts would certainly fail
both a Daubert reliability test and a Frye general acceptance test.
D.

Drug Recognition Experts: A Model Analysis of Police Officers Offering
Unreliable Science

As described above, courts have repeatedly declined to conduct Frye and
Daubert analysis of police officer experts, thus no case exists that is illustrative of a
proper analysis of gang expert testimony. However, court decisions regarding Drug
Recognition Expert (DRE) testimony can be used to demonstrate the type of

175. Chesson v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 75 A.3d 932, 936 (Md. 2013) (“[V]alidity, having
been defined as ‘the extent to which something measures what it purports to measure,’ and reliability,
characterized as ‘the ability of a measure to produce the same result each time it is applied to the same
thing . . . consistency or reproducibility.’”).
176. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235, 241 (Md. 2009).
177. Chesson, 75 A.3d at 936; David Medoff, The Scientific Basis of Psychological Testing
Considerations Following Daubert, Kumho, & Joiner, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 199, 200 (2003) (“[T]he
accuracy with which a measuring spoon truly measures one teaspoon of vanilla extract reflects
its validity.”).
178. See MD Rule 4-263(d)(8); MD Rule 5-702.
179. Transcript of Record, supra note 6 at 16:204–206.
180. Id. at 16:37–38.
181. Id. at 16:58–59.
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behavioral science evidence that fails Frye and Daubert and should therefore be
excluded or limited. In the field of DRE’s, police officers use a number of factors to
determine whether a person is under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The reasoning
behind a court’s exclusion of this testimony mirrors the problems with admitting
police officer expert testimony in gang cases.
In Maryland v. Brightful,182 the court applied a Frye test to the protocol used
by DREs to determine whether a person is impaired by a drug. This test, described
in detail in Brightful, is a 12-step process in which law enforcement perform a series
of examinations on a person such as a breath alcohol test, an eye examination, an
examination of vital signs, and an interview.183 The Brightful court found that the
testimony being offered was scientific in nature because officers must rule out certain
medical diagnoses in order to find drug impairment. 184 Despite the scientific nature
of the test, the people conducting the test had no formal medical or scientific training
and their only preparation was a 72-hour training course given by other police
officers.185 Furthermore, the test did not follow the scientific method—there “is no
set number of . . . [required] indicators in order to find someone impaired,”186 no way
to distinguish between competing causes of the same result,187 no standardization
such that the test can be used multiple times by multiple people and provide the same
result,188 and no peer reviewed studies.189 The Brightful court concluded that based
on these failings, the DRE protocol failed to produce accurate and reliable
determinations and the police officer’s training “does not enable DREs to accurately
observe the signs and symptoms of drug impairment, therefore, police officers are
not able to reach accurate and reliable conclusions’ [sic] regarding what drug may
be causing impairment.”190 Furthermore, the court found that the test is not accepted
by the relevant medical community, which must be defined as disinterested scientists
(such as doctors, ophthalmologists, and toxicologists) and not proponents of the
program such as law enforcement agencies.191
As with DRE protocol, the testimony offered by gang “experts” is scientific
in nature, as described above. Yet, the police officers administering, investigating,
evaluating or testifying, do not have formal training in sociology, psychology,
anthropology, or other social or behavioral sciences. Furthermore, a gang expert’s
process does not follow the credible scientific method––it is not reliable or
replicable; the same result would not be achieved if the test was done multiple times
or by different people; there is no way to rule out competing reasons for the same
result; and there are no peer reviewed studies.
An example of this lack of reliability occurred in KJ’s trial, quoted above,
where the expert stated that he would use “two or more” factors to determine whether
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

2012 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 1 (Mar. 5, 2012).
Id. at *2–5.
See id. at *6–7, *9–10, *15–16.
See id. at *2, *5–6, *8.
Id. at *5, *11.
See id. at *20, *22.
See id. at *22–23.
Id. at *21.
Id. at *39.
Id. at *32.
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an individual is a BGF member.192 The two factors used during cross-examination
were the use of hand signs and association with known BGF members. 193 When
asked on cross-examination whether the use of a peace sign, i.e. a hand sign, and
association with BGF members, would make an individual a suspected BGF
member, the expert stated “no,”194 essentially proving the unreliability of the method
employed.

V.

THE DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF FAILING TO APPLY
FRYE AND DAUBERT

Courts’ refusal to apply Frye and Daubert to police officer gang expert
testimony is concerning given the rationale behind the admissibility tests and the
impact on criminal Defendants’ due process rights. The concern relating to the Frye
“general acceptance” test is twofold. First, courts emphasize that “Lay jurors tend to
give considerable weight to ‘scientific’ evidence when presented by ‘experts’ [sic]
with impressive credentials.”195 Given this tendency, it is critical that the expert
present a methodology that is generally accepted, rather that assuming the jury will
assess its validity for themselves.196 Second, courts note the importance for both
parties that there be “a minimal reserve of experts [who] exist [that] can critically
examine the validity of a scientific determination in a particular case” as “[t]he ability
to produce rebuttal experts, equally conversant with the mechanics and methods of a
particular technique, may prove to be essential.”197
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Daubert emphasized that experts are
allowed to testify to issues about which they lack firsthand knowledge because of
the “assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge
and experience of his/[her] discipline.198 By refusing to apply Frye and Daubert
courts deny the “fundamental fairness” that Frye and Daubert were intended to
ensure.199
A refusal to apply Frye to state gang case prosecutions, deprives criminal
Defendants charged as gang members of the fundamental fairness of “requir[ing]
that before the results of a [s]cientific process can be used against him, he is entitled
to a [s]cientific judgment on the reliability of that process.”200 In Reed, the first case
applying the Frye standard in Maryland, the court adopted the reasoning of Frye,
noting that juries have a tendency to weigh scientific evidence more heavily because
of “mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury” that science carries.201 Because of jurors
192. Transcript of Record, supra note 6, at 16:39–40.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 16:205.
195. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 386 (Md. 1978).
196. Id. at 371.
197. Id. at 370 (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 174)).
198. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
199. Reed, 391 A.2d at 369–70 (“[F]airness to a litigant would seem to require that before the results
of a Scientific process can be used against him, he is entitled to a Scientific judgment on the reliability of
that process.”).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 370.
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tendencies to weigh science more heavily, Reed warned that the general acceptability
standard was required to prevent parties from introducing evidence that lacked
reliability and validity, i.e. junk science, to sway the decision-making process of the
jury.202 Without requiring police officer gang experts to demonstrate reliability and
validity of their process, the very safeguards Frye provides are abandoned. As a
result, juries hear and are persuaded or confused by unreliable evidence. Allowing
juries to rely on unreliable science deprives Defendants of fundamental fairness
because the jury is permitted to place substantial weight on evidence that appears
conclusive but is unreliable.203
The concerns that motivated the decisions in Frye, Reed, Kelly and Daubert
are equally applicable in the context of gang experts. There are also three particular
aspects of gang evidence that make it particularly important to apply an admissibility
test. First, gang evidence is generally recognized as highly incendiary. 204 Gang
experts, then, present prejudicial evidence with an unearned aura of reliability. By
allowing an expert to testify about gang membership, evidence that is already
inflammatory, carries increased influence upon the jury. Second, beyond the regular
tendency to over-credit an expert, juries may credit the testimony of a police officer
gang expert in particular based on their status as a police officer. This increases the
likelihood that the jury will see the evidence as “conclusive” or “infallible” based on
who it is coming from, rather than the reliability or validity of the evidence.205 Third,
gang expert evidence does not simply lack general acceptance—it lacks virtually any
acceptance at all among scientists, placing it most appropriately in the category of

202. Indeed, Frye, the namesake of the test, prevented the admission of lie detector. And, while Frye,
did not address the effect of lie detector on juries, later cases involving lie detectors warned that jurors
would treat lie-detectors as “conclusive” despite the lack of reliability. Id.
203. Id. at 369–70 (“[F]airness to a litigant would seem to require that before the results of a
Scientific process can be used against him, he is entitled to a Scientific judgment on the reliability of that
process.”); Wilson v. State, 803 A.2d 1034, 1046 (Md. 2002) (“The case sub judice was based entirely on
circumstantial evidence. In light of the role the statistics, and particularly the product rule, played in the
expert’s testimony, we are unable ‘to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way
influenced the verdict.’”).
204. For example, see Gutierrez v. State, 32 A.3d 2, 13 (Md. 2011) (“[W]e remain ever-cognizant of
the highly incendiary nature of gang evidence and the possibility that a jury may determine guilt by
association rather than by its belief that the defendant committed the criminal acts.” However, the court
ultimately found that the Defendant’s membership in MS-13 was more relevant to the motive of the
murder than prejudicial.); see also State v. Torrez, 2009-NMSC-029, ¶ 24, 146 N.M. 331, 210 P.3d 228
(“[T]o be sure, evidence of gang affiliation could be used improperly as a backdoor means of introducing
character evidence by associating the defendant with the gang and describing the gang’s bad act . . .
[However,] Defendant does not dispute that the expert’s testimony was offered to rebut his claim of selfdefense, and therefore went to his motive for shooting at the house . . . [thus,] the expert’s testimony was
not impermissible”); see also People v. Olguin, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(“[T]estimony [of an argument related to defacement of gang graffiti] was relevant to explain the
Defendants’ desire to discover who crossed out their graffiti and their violent reaction when Ramirez
appeared and began yelling, ‘Shelley Street.’ It was highly probative on the issues of intent and motive.
While Defendants’ gang membership and their gang activities was prejudicial to a certain degree, the
evidence was highly relevant to the prosecution’s theory of how and why Ramirez was killed.”).
205. United States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287, 1303 (10th Cir. 2013) (Holloway, J., dissenting)
(“[The testimony] represented the authoritative word of a law-enforcement officer, one who lived in the
same community as the jurors and who was presented to them as a well-qualified expert in gang matters.”).
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“junk science.” A University of Chicago study on gangs,206 which is the “most
extensive review of literature on gangs to date” found that there are “few reliable
research sources” provided to form a basis for gang expert testimony. 207 Even Hill
acknowledged unreliability of gang evidence in stating that the “credibility of
individual gang members,” the very source of the testimony, are “questionable.”208
Thus, the very reasoning behind Frye—the need to provide a Defendant with a fair
trial—illustrates the harm caused when courts refuse to apply Frye.
A secondary reason for Frye and Daubert is that there is concern that expert
witnesses may be biased in favor of the party calling the expert. 209 Because an
attorney has an ethical “duty to zealously advocate” for the client, then logically the
attorney will hire an expert who favors and agrees with the theory of the prosecution
and would not call an expert who would hurt the party. 210 Simply put, there is no
obligation that the attorney call an expert who will provide a balanced or neutral
opinion but rather the “duty to zealous advoca[cy]” can encourage party to seek
experts to testify to science that is not generally accepted simply to support the
prosecution’s case.211
Within the context of gangs, bias is a serious concern because police are an
integral arm of the prosecutor’s office. Judge Holloway in a dissenting opinion
summarized the situation as follows:
[Office Lujan’s testimony] represented the authoritative word of a
law-enforcement officer, one who lived in the same community as
the jurors and who was presented to them as a well-qualified expert
206. Irving Spergel, Youth Gangs: Problem and Response: A Review of the Literature (Assessment;
Part I), (National Youth Gang Suppression and Intervention Project, A Cooperative Project with the Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Planning, U.S. Department of Justice, and the School of Social
Service Administration, University of Chicago, at 3-5 (Apr. 1990)) [hereinafter Irving Spergel and
hereinafter The University of Chicago study.]
207. Such unreliability come from “a number of reasons: (1) gang members themselves are unreliable
sources of information, (2) the media exaggerates or sensationalizes gang problems, (3) political
motivations cause prosecution, probation, corrections, public service, and nonprofit agencies to minimize
as well as to exaggerate the extent of gang problems, (4) there has not been a consistent method of data
collection for law enforcement of social agencies serving gang clients, (5) a variety of theoretical and
methodological problems have hindered the development of adequate knowledge about gangs, (6) an
adequate empirical data base has not existed, and (7) the ‘[v]ariations among gangs across neighborhoods,
cities, and countries, and probably across schools, prisons, and other institutional contexts have often been
disregarded.’” Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
739, 771–72 (1990).
208. People v. Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr.3d 251, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
209. Blackwell v. Wyth, 971 A.2d 235, 245 (Md. 2009).
210. Id. at 245–46 (“There is no reason to hire an expert, for example, who will tell the jury that a
client’s losses are worth $150,000 if an attorney can find an equally credible expert willing to testify that
the true figure is $300,000. Moreover, there is no ethical obligation on attorneys to hire mainstream
experts. Indeed, their duty to zealously advocate for their clients may require them to hire outliers if it
would help their client’s case.”).
211. Id. Additionally, for example, in Blackwell, the Plaintiff sued the a vaccine company alleging that
a mercury substance in the vaccine caused her son to develop autism and in support of the claim hired an
expert who would testify to the effects of vaccine on the development of autism. The expert’s testimony
concerning the effect of vaccines of autism was not generally accepted and was barred under Frye and the
Court noted that “duty to zealously advocate” encourages the party’s to hire “outliers” or experts who are
not generally accepted to further the party’s case.
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in gang matters. Officer Lujan’s testimony was calibrated to obtain
a conviction, and that is precisely the problem. He did not know
Mr. Archuleta, but he told the jury that he knew what a Sureño was
like. And they were all pretty much the same, and they were all
pretty evil. That, in a nutshell, was Officer Lujan’s expert
testimony. Its purpose seems largely to have been to instill fear and
loathing in the jury.212
As Judge Holloway emphasized, police officers are far from disinterested
experts. An “[o]fficer[‘s] testimony [is] calibrated to obtain a conviction” and to
assist in convicting the Defendant.213 Moreover, given that the criminal prosecution
is a process by which “advocates for each side present evidence in the light most
favorable to their case,”214 and is adversarial in nature, the state’s job is to present
the best evidence for their case, not the most neutral or reliable. Without the
application of Frye or Daubert, the jury is permitted to hear testimony from a police
officer gang expert that seems “conclusive” and “infallible” even when clear issues
of bias are present.
In jurisdictions following Daubert, all expert opinion, including police gang
expert testimony should be required to abide by Daubert in applicable jurisdictions
because following the decision in Kumho, all expert testimony is subject to the
Daubert test.215 Thus, in the 29 states that follow Daubert,216 all police officers
admitted as “gang experts” must show that their methods of gang identification are
reliable under the test laid out in Daubert. In jurisdictions following Frye, a test
always applies when testimony is scientific. Even if courts determine that testimony
is not scientific in nature, it still must be reliable under the state’s rules of evidence
for expert witnesses.
VI.

PROPOSAL: REQUIRE GANG EXPERTS TO FULFILL SAME
FRYE AND DAUBERT STANDARD AS DRE

In order to create some semblance of justice and provide due process to
those charged under state gang statutes, courts must ensure that gang expert
testimony is reliable. Without reliability, expert testimony should be excluded and
limited to its appropriate weight.
Recent developments in Drug Recognition Expert testimony are illustrative
of this point. Like the 12 factors used by gang “experts,” the DRE uses a 12 factor
protocol that was developed by law enforcement agencies that allow police officers
to form opinions through non-scientific and scientific observations, to determine
whether a person is under the influence of drugs or alcohol.217

212. United States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287, 1303 (10th Cir. 2013) (Holloway, J., dissenting).
213. Id.
214. Blackwell, 971 A.2d at 239 (“By contrast, attorneys can seek expert witnesses who will parrot
the attorneys’ line, and, indeed, implicitly ‘bribe’ them to do so.”).
215. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
216. Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post–Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other
Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 (2001).
217. For a full description of the DRE test, see State v. Sampson, 6 P.3d 543, 548 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
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While the use of gang expert testimony is a relatively new phenomena, the
use of DRE’s dates back 50 years. Unlike gang experts, many courts have subjected
DRE expert testimony to the Frye or Daubert standards for admissibility. Other
courts have determined that DRE testimony is not scientific and Frye and Daubert
do not apply. In those cases, the courts have limited the testimony to personal
observations and prohibited the expert from offering scientific conclusions. The
evolution of prosecuting DUI cases demonstrates that the type of factor tests used by
gang experts can be placed under the purview of Frye and Daubert. Requiring DRE
experts to abide by Frye and Daubert or be limited in their testimony ensures that
any scientific evidence offered follows a methodology that can be tested by others in
the field, creating reliability and verification. Requiring Frye and Daubert protects
the due process rights of criminal Defendants and the fundamental fairness of trial.
Gang experts, like DRE experts, offer scientific testimony. Gang expert testimony
should be similarly subject to Frye or Daubert and courts should correspondingly
admit, exclude, or limit the evidence as mandated by the appropriate standard.
A.

What Courts Considering Gang Experts Can Learn from Treatment of
Drug Recognition Experts

This section proceeds in three parts (a) explaining what Drug Recognition
Experts are; (b) categorizing DRE testimony as scientific or non-scientific and
detailing the corresponding treatment of each form of testimony; and (c) proposing
that courts similarly apply Frye and Daubert to gang experts or limit their testimony
to personal observations.
1.

What are drug recognition experts?

In the mid-1900s, in response to the increase in automobile accidents and a
need to respond to alarming rates of death from drinking and driving, states began
prioritizing drunk driving prosecutions.218 While drunk driving legislation was
passed in the early 1900s, early laws did not have a specific measure of intoxication.
Until the 1970s, prosecutions for drunk driving were generally based on the
subjective views of a police officer, without any clear methodology.219 Starting in
the 1970s, the Los Angeles Police Department developed the concept of a Drug
Recognition Expert protocol, which was meant to provide a standardized method to
determine whether a person was driving under the influence of drugs or a mix of
alcohol and drugs.220 Officers who are trained as Drug Recognition Experts follow a

218. See generally BARRON H. LERNER, ONE FOR THE ROAD: DRUNK DRIVING SINCE 1900 (2011).
219. The Evolution of the DRE Officer and Program, L.A. POLICE DEP’T,
http://www.lapdonline.org/special_operations_support_division/content_basic_view/1038
[https://perma.cc/BUW9-BUDL]; see also LERNER, supra note 218.
220. See generally Gregory T. Seiders, Call in the Experts: The Drug Recognition Expert
Protocol and its Role in Effetively Prosecuting Drugged Drivers, 26 WIDENER L.J. 229–75 (2017). See
also Drug Recognition Experts, THE INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE (IACP), https:// www.theiacp.org
/drug-recognition-experts-dres [https://perma.cc/T7U6-W4WY] (LAPD consulted with various medical
doctors, research psychologists, and other medical professionals to develop a simple, standardized
procedure for recognizing drug influence and impairment. Their efforts culminated in the development of
a multi-step protocol and the first DRE program).
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12-step protocol.221 The formalization of the Drug Recognition Expert protocol
created a standard for assessing whether someone was driving under the influence,
and limited the officers who offer testimony that is scientific in nature. Furthermore,
the publication of clear standards allowed courts to evaluate the testimony for its
admissibility, limit its admissibility according to its reliability, and offer the criminal
Defendant and their lawyers an opportunity to critique the methodology used, data
acquired, and the validity of opinions formed in a transparent manner. These
requirements provide a means to ensure due process and the fulfillment of the Sixth
Amendment right to adequate counsel and confrontation.
2.

The current standards for drug recognition experts

Today, courts are divided on whether Drug Recognition Experts offer
scientific evidence and should be subject to the corresponding admissibility test.222
Some courts have found that the evidence is scientific, and thus have subjected it to
Daubert, Frye, or the state’s admissibility test.223 Other courts have found that the
evidence is not scientific and therefore can be allowed in under the state’s rule for
expert evidence without further testing.224 Notably, where drug recognition and field
sobriety tests are either deemed unscientific (and not subject to Frye and Daubert),
or deemed scientific but fail Frye and Daubert, the expert is significantly limited in
his or her testimony and may be required to offer only observations without
conclusions about whether the Defendant is under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
This approach represents a way forward for the treatment of gang experts.
i.

Limits on police expert testimony in cases where DRE is scientific
evidence

A number of cases have found that DRE testimony is scientific, at least in
part, and have thus subjected the testimony to Frye and Daubert. In some cases,
courts have found that this testimony fails Frye or Daubert.
Where courts have found that DRE testimony is scientific but fails Frye or
Daubert, such testimony is deemed inadmissible or is limited. For example, in State
v. Brightful, the court determined that DRE testimony is scientific because the DRE
officers were applying a 12-step DRE protocol and based on the results of the exam,
determining that the individual was impaired due to drugs rather than medical
conditions.225 In coming to this conclusion that the individual condition was due to

221. Seiders, supra note 220 at 235–38 (the 12 steps include Breath Alcohol Test; Interview with
Arresting Officer; Preliminary Examination; Eye Examination; Field Sobriety Test; Vital Signs;
Darkroom Examination; Physical Examination; DRE Opinion; Injection Sites Check;
Post Miranda Interrogation; Toxicological Examination).
222. See generally id. See also chart in Appendix of United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D.
Md. 2002).
223. See, e.g., State v. Chitwood , 879 N.W.2d 786, 796–800 (Wis. Ct. Ap. 2016); State v. Daly, 775
N.W.2d 47, 58–62 (Neb. 2009); State v. Sampson, 6 P.3d 543, 552–54 (Or. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Baity,
991 P.2d 1151 (Wash 2000). See also chart in Appendix of United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530
(D. Md. 2002).
224. Many of these decisions occurred before the decision in Kumho Tire, which, as described in this
paper, requires that Daubert be applied to all expert testimony.
225. State v. Brightful, 2012 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 1 at *6–7, 9–10, 15–16.

230

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 51; No. 1

drug impairment rather than a medical condition, the DRE officer was functionally
making a medical diagnosis that would normally involve a physician’s judgment.226
Because the officer is making a medical diagnosis, the testimony is scientific in
nature and subject to Frye. 227 The court found that the test failed Frye because it did
not follow the scientific method and was not accepted in the relevant scientific
community.228 Based on that finding, the court granted the Defendant’s motion to
exclude the drug recognition expert protocol and drug recognition expert opinions.229
Likewise, in U.S. v. Horn,230 the court found that the DRE testimony was
scientific, but that it failed Daubert, therefore the DRE expert needed to be
correspondingly limited in their testimony to the trier of fact. The court specifically
took issue with one of the factors used in the DRE protocol–– Horizontal Gaze
Nsystagmus (HGN). The court held that HGN had not been shown to produce
reliable results and was not generally accepted within an unbiased scientific or
technical community.231 Because the test did not reliably rule out competing causes
of the same possible result (i.e. that HGN might be caused by something other than
intoxication), the court found that police presenting HGN factors of the DRE
protocol must present it as circumstantial rather than direct evidence of alcohol
consumption, and cannot use this evidence alone to establish intoxication. 232 For
example, the expert could not cite to HGN as the sole basis for believing the
individual was under the influence of alcohol nor could the police officer state that
the results provided proof of a specific blood alcohol content. 233 The court further
explained, adopting the reasoning of State v. Meador,234 that where a test is not
reliable, the testimony must be limited to the officer’s observations without an
“attempt to attach significance” to the Defendant’s performance on the test or use of
the words “pass,” “fail,” or “points.”235 Further, Horn cautioned that allowing
conclusory language (such as allowing the DRE officer to testify to a specific blood
alcohol content finding based on the HGN test) where the test itself is unreliable, can
be “misleading to the jury” and “creates a potential for enhancing the significance of
the observations in relationship to the ultimate determination of impairment, as such
terms give these layperson observations an aura of scientific validity.” 236
ii.

Limits on police expert testimony in cases where DRE evidence is
considered non-scientific

In other cases, the court has found that DRE testimony is not scientific and
therefore is not subject to Frye or Daubert. It is precisely because DRE testimony is
not considered “scientific” that courts limit the testimony and scope from passing or
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *37.
Id. at *40.
United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D. Md. 2002).
Id. at 549, 557.
Id. at 555–56.
Id.
State v. Meador, 674 So.2d 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996):
Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 559
Id.
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allowing the state to elude to the evidence as scientific. For example, in U.S. v.
Everett the court found that DRE was not scientific, and that based on this “the DRE
can testify to the probabilities, based upon his or her observations and clinical
findings, but cannot testify, by way of scientific opinion, that the conclusion is an
established fact by any reasonable scientific standard.”237 Similarly in State v.
Klawitter the court found that the DRE protocol was not scientific and therefore the
state could not “attempt to exaggerate the officer’s credentials by referring to the
officer as a ‘Drug Recognition Expert’” or “unfairly suggest that the officer’s opinion
is entitled to greater weight than it deserves.”238 Likewise, the court in Williams v.
State followed this line of reasoning, holding that the evidence could be allowed in
but it is “somewhat misleading for the State to present the officer as ‘Drug
Recognition Expert’” and that “the State must lay a proper predicate before referring
to a DRE as anything other than a Drug Recognition Evaluator or Examiner.” 239
B.

Requiring Frye and Daubert DRE standards on gang experts

The courts’ treatment of the DRE testimony over the last 50 years
demonstrates the importance of identifying the testimony as scientific, determining
whether it is generally accepted within the applicable scientific field, and limiting it
where it is not. Gang expert testimony should be limited the same way. Gang experts
use a similar factor-based protocol to the DRE protocol. Gang experts, like DRE
experts, base their findings on observations and interviews with the individual, and
physical examinations: psychological (for gang experts) and physiological (for
DRE). DRE physical examinations include the observation of physical signs of drug
use, like needle marks and bloodshot eyes,240 while gang expert observations include
gang insignia, hand symbols, and tattoos.241 DRE protocols require the officer to
offer an opinion on the physiological effect of drugs or alcohol on the Defendant.
Similarly, gang experts are required to form opinions on the psychology of gang
members and explain their actions in conformity with those opinions. The DRE
protocol was developed by police officers to answer the ultimate question: is the
Defendant under the influence of drugs or alcohol and what is the level of
impairment? The gang expert’s 12 factor test poses an analogous question: is the
Defendant a member of a gang and were his actions gang related?
Accordingly, I propose that gang experts, like Drug Recognition Experts,
be subjected to the appropriate admissibility test (Daubert, Frye, or the state’s
equivalent). If their testimony fails the test as in Horne and Brightful, then gang
expert testimony should be excluded or treated as lay-witness testimony and limited
to observations only. Although this paper argues that gang evidence is social science,
in cases where the court does not find that gang evidence is science the court has a
duty, as in Everette and Klawitter, to ensure that the jury is not swayed by the title
of “expert” and provide instructions that limit the purported accolades and
conclusions of the “expert.” Limiting the testimony ensures that unduly prejudicial
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

U.S. v. Everett, 972 F. Supp. 1313, 1320 (D. Nev. 1997).
State v. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d 577, 586 (Minn. 1994).
Williams v. State, 710 So.2d 24, n.23 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
State v. Sampson, 6 P.3d 543, 548–49 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
See discussion supra Introduction, and discussion supra Part II.
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and unreliable junk science does not unduly persuade and confuse the jury. Like DRE
experts, if a gang “expert” cannot prove the reliability of his or her methods, the
officer’s testimony must be treated as lay testimony, and only allowed if the officer
has personal knowledge of the facts of the case. Nothing else should be permitted to
sway the jury. In KJ’s case, where Detective Smith had no personal knowledge of
KJ and no verifiable data to support his conclusions, the testimony should have been
excluded altogether.
C. The Real-Life Reason for Using Gang Statutes and Police Gang Experts
Alan Jackson, in his article Prosecuting Gang Cases: What Local
Prosecutors Need to Know, understood it and got it right, when he said: “The easiest
way to get gang evidence admitted in trial is by filing a substantive gang crime or
gang enhancement allegation . . . Once that charge or enhancement is filed,
everything the gang expert says becomes relevant to the gang charge.” 242 Jackson’s
point is clear, though arrogant: no matter the reliability, truthfulness, or relevance to
the actual crime charged, gang allegations are a sure-fire way to win over juries and
convict criminal Defendants even where actual evidence of guilt is lacking. Such
blatant manipulation of community sentiments, real fear of violence, real pain, real
loss, and real systematic oppression, clothed under a call for “Law and Order” that
subjugates the same people who have always been subjugated in this country, is
fundamentally un-American. Or maybe it is exactly American, (a badge of slavery
and a means of mass incarceration) yet it stands at odds against the constitutional
principles bestowed upon Black people and all others, through the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporation of due process to the States.
No longer should there exist a space in American jurisprudence where, as
Pacido G. Gomez wrote in his article It Is Not So Simply Because an Expert Says It
Is So: The Reliability of Gang Expert Testimony Regarding Membership in Criminal
Street Gangs:
Not only does the police officer gang expert support the gang
allegation, the gang expert can provide juries with a motive for the
crime underlying the gang charge, define the meaning of obscure
graffiti to show identity and an admission of crime, explain why a
prosecution does not have any credible witnesses to support their
theory of the case, and explain why a witness would say the
Defendant was not where the police say he was. The gang expert’s
opinion enables a prosecutor to cast a wide net to establish criminal
liability for seemingly innocent behaviors that are not obviously
related to the alleged crime. Police officer gang experts can do all
this because they purport to understand gang culture.243

242. Alan Jackson, Prosecuting Gang Cases: What Local Prosecutors Need to Know, 42-JUN
PROSECUTOR 32, 37–38 (2008). Jackson suggested to prosecutors that it is not only acceptable but actually
a preferable approach use gang allegations, gang experts, and fear of the gang as a means to convict where
there is insufficient evidence. Id.
243. Christopher McGinnis & Sarah Eisenhart, Interrogation is Not Ethnography: The Irrational
Admission of Gang Cops and Experts in the Field of Sociology, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 111,
126 (2010).
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Gang expert testimony can no longer be allowed to usurp the rules of
evidence, reject traditional rules of criminal procedure, replace investigations, do
away with the need for creditable evidence, and abandon the age-old American
concept of innocent until proven guilty, in constructing the prosecution’s case. If due
process means anything, it is that a person’s liberty cannot be taken away based on
one expert’s unreliable opinion.
CONCLUSION
Police gang expert testimony relies on the scientific method and is social
scientific in its predictive nature. Thus, it must abide by the requirements of Frye in
jurisdictions where applicable. In jurisdictions that follow Daubert, gang expert
testimony must be subject to the same reliability requirements as all expert
testimony, scientific or not. Gang expert testimony that is scientific in nature and
cannot overcome Daubert or Frye’s stringent requirements must be excluded
outright. Gang evidence, similar to DUI evidence, should be limited in scope to
testimony that complies with these clearly established expert testimony rules. If gang
expert testimony is going to be admissible, like DRE, a well-defined methodology
must be established. If a court determines that a gang expert’s testimony is not
scientific, it should be limited to firsthand, lay-witness testimony, where their
conclusions of law, conjecture, and predictions are excluded. Only their tangible
investigations, recovery of evidence and observations should be admissible where
relevant. Requiring such limitations on gang expert testimony is the only way to
ensure a fairer trial for criminal Defendants charged in state gang cases. It is no
accident that criminal Defendants like KJ, from communities like Greenmount
(subjected to inadequate housing, educational resources and healthcare), have their
due process and equal protection rights disregarded in this manner. Their
constitutional rights are trampled for a perceived greater good––taking allegedly
violent individuals off the streets and destroying the criminal organization that
supports them. The truly American thing to do, when attempting to move toward a
true greater good, is to provide the highest level of protection to those most despised,
vulnerable and policed. Applying the same rules of expert testimony that civil
litigants receive when money is on the line and corporate interest is at hand,
embodies a true expression of Due Process, Equal Protection and justice for all.
Abiding by clearly established evidentiary rules, even when prosecuting gang
members, will lessen the power of the carceral state, and is a step in the direction of
abolishing practices that are fundamentally unfair. This will hopefully focus
resources on funding efforts to improve communities like Greenmount rather than
simply locking up its inhabitant people—people like KJ.

